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The hallmark of American adjudication is the adversary system. The
virtues of the adversary system, are so deeply engrained in the American
legal psyche that most lawyers do not question it. The majority of the
world, however, uses some version of the inquisitorial system that evolved
primarily in continental Europe.1 Furthermore, some chinks in the adver-
sarial armor have recently begun to appear: There is considerable debate
over the adversary.system in the literature in recent years,2 and many non-
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1. See Saks, Accuracy v. Advocacy: Expert Testimony Before the Bench, TECH. REV.,
Aug.-Sept., 1987, at 42, 43. See generally A. ENOELMANN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIvIL
PROCEDURE (1927).
2. See, e.g., M. FRANIKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984); Byrne, The Adversary System: Who Needs
It?, in ETmCS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 204 (M. Davis & F. Elliston eds. 1986); Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 823 (1985); Miller, The Adversary
System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1984). There is nothing new about
criticizing the adversary system. See, e.g., Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 40 Am. L. REV. 729, 738-40 (1906). This article focuses
on civil procedure, but there is debate over the adversary system in the criminal context as
well. See, e.g., L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977). There is also a rich literature on
adversarial ethics. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETEHCS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975); Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83 (D. Luban ed.
1983); Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal
Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451 (1981) [hereinafter Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse]; Schwartz,
The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978) (non
advocate functions of lawyers); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 29.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provides rules governing the lawyer's duty to
the adversary system of justice. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSmILrTY AND CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1980), EC 7-19 to EC 7-39.
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adversarial elements 3 have become important parts of the American ad-
judicatory system under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The adversary system is characterized by party control of the investi-
gation and presentation of evidence and argument, and by a passive
decisionmaker who merely listens to both sides and renders a decision
based on what she has heard. An ideology has developed that seeks to
justify the adversary system, but the adherents have had some difficulty
settling on the most appropriate justification. The current ideology extols
the adversary system primarily as the best system for protecting individual
dignity and autonomy, but some theorists continue to profess the original
ideology, which says that adversarial presentation and argument are the
best way to arrive at the truth.4
The trends away from adversarial adjudication and the difficulty in
justifying the adversary system suggest that there are significant failures
in the system that we are trying to adjust for.5 These failures are primarily
in adversarial fact-finding. Thus, we might ask whether adversarial ide-
ology is correct or even useful. Focusing on the ideology tends to rigidify
our thinking; it is more important to consider how to build a system that
meets our goals and reflects our values. This article examines the values,
the ideology, and the trends in American adjudication and concludes that
most of the effectiveness of the current, imperfect system stems from the
non-adversarial elements that have developed, especially over the last fifty
years; this conclusion is best illustrated in complex litigation. The article
seeks to demystify the adversarial ideology so that we can move confidently
toward a more efficient-and probably more inquisitorial-system.
The most important task is to identify the values and goals that an
adjudicatory system reflects. The article begins with that examination in
Part I. Part II then defines the adversary system, particularly in compar-
3. By "non-adversarial elements" I mean elements that are inconsistent, to some degree,
with the two primary characteristics of adversarial adjudication: party control of the
investigation and presentation of evidence, and a passive judge. See infra notes 43-49 and
accompanying text; see also Langbein, supra note 2, at 824 n.4. Contentiousness is obviously
part of adversarial adjudication. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY
IN AMERICAN JUSTCE 80 (1949); Pound, supra note 2, at 738-40. I do not, however, use
"non-adversarial" to mean "non-contentious." There is some debate over how contentious
litigation tactics ought to be. See, e.g., Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J. 48 (July 1,
1987); Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A. J. 79 (March
1, 1988).
4. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
5. These might be akin to market failures in economics. A pure, individualistic free-
market system does not produce the most efficient distribution of goods and services, as
economists recognize. See, e.g., J. BuRKHEAD & J. MINER, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 99-141
(1971); M. OLSON, THE LoGIc OF COLLECTrvE ACTION (1965); Bator, The Anatomy of Market
Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 363 (Aug. 1958); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
EcON. 1 (1960). Similarly, a pure, individualistic adversary system of adjudication does not
always produce the best outcome. See J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 92.
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ison with inquisitorial systems such as are found in continental Europe.
It also summarizes and evaluates the ideology of the adversary system.
Part III traces how we arrived at the present system, beginning with its
origins in medieval procedure. To take us to the present, the history then
turns to the developing non-adversarial elements in litigation and their
relationship to complex litigation, which is less adversarial than the simpler
forms. Finally, Part IV relates the values and ideology to modern devel-
opments, concluding that while modern trends in litigation do not comport
well with adversarial ideology, they promote sound values and contribute
to a more effective system.
I. VALuEs IN ADJUDICATORY SYSTEMS
The goals of adjudication are a starting point for assessing the values
reflected in an adjudicatory system. The goals say something about the
structure of society and how society views the role of authority. Similarly
telling is society's view of the importance and definition of "fair" adju-
dication. Finally, the adjudicatory system reflects the relative importance
that society places on individual and communitarian values. This section
describes the values as reflected in Western systems in general and the
American system in particular.
A. Goals of a Procedural System
Procedure is simply the means by which we reach decisions. In theory,
it has no substantive content but is a neutral set of rules that enables us
to reach fair substantive decisions. 6 It is, however, important to look at
the goals of the procedural system itself, distinct from the substantive
decisions that come out of it. Those goals might be termed conflict
resolution, rule-making, and behavior modification.
1. Conflict Resolution
Resolving conflicts is the primary goal of any procedural system. By
providing a forum for conflict resolution and sanctions for failing to abide
6. Many commentators have noted that substance and procedure are not so easily
compartmentalized. See, e.g., Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading
of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718-22 (1975); Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive
Rights, 18 NoMos: DUE PROCESS 182 (1977); Comment, The Impact of the Class Action on
Rule 10b-5, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 337, 337 (1971). Historically, the distinction between
substance and procedure did not begin to emerge until Blackstone's Commentaries. See T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 381-82 (5th ed. 1956). See infra
notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
1989]
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by decisions of that forum, society reduces its citizens' desire for self-
help. The result is a more orderly society. But if the goal were simply to
resolve conflicts, it could be achieved by allowing a judge to flip a coin.
Much of the agonizing over appropriate procedural rules could be avoided
in such a system. Obviously, however, such a system would not be seen
as fair: Victory would depend solely on a random event. Citizens would
not voluntarily submit to such a system. The conflict resolution goal,
then, is tempered by other goals that limit how conflicts can be resolved.
The first of these goals is "truth." Our procedural system must resolve
conflicts in such a way as to achieve a true characterization of the events
out of which the conflict arose. Because truth is elusive, however 7 it is
not always possible to be sure of the past.8 Witnesses may differ in what
they think they saw;9 or there may be no witnesses on a significant issue
so that the past must be reconstructed from circumstantial evidence; 10 or,
in some cases, witnesses may deliberately lie." Once the evidence is
presented, it must be interpreted, leaving room for further indeterminacy.'2
These problems with reconstructing the past are a primary reason for the
existence of burdens of proof.' 3 Each party to a dispute must try to
7. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 3, at ch. III; Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and
Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1076-79
(1975). Many courts have noted the difficulty of determining the truth. See, e.g., Board of
Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 107 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vance v. Rice,
524 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Jack Neilson, Inc., 248
So.2d 412, 417 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Township of Wayne v. Kosoff, 73 N.J. 8, 11, 372
A.2d 289, 290 (1977).
8. See generally J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 37-41; J. FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 1-41
(1945).
9. See, e.g., E. LoFrus & J. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 30-
31 (1987); Kelner, What is Truth?, 55 FLA. B.J. 432, 432 (1981). See generally J. MARSHALL,
LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (2d ed. 1980); A.D. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
10. See, e.g., Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946); Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372 (1943); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 338, at 789 (2d
ed. 1972). For a critical view of circumstantial evidence, see Sheldon, Circumstantial Proof
in Products Liability Cases: A Dangerous Precedent, 30 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 265
(1980).
11. Despite occasional convictions such as that of former White House aide Michael
Deaver, perjury is difficult to control. See Campion & Hamilton, A Review of Perjury, 6
LITIGATION 22 (Spring, 1980). Because it completely undermines the search for truth and
justice, however, perjury is "considered one of the most odious crimes in our law."
Gershman, The "Perjury" Trap, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 636 (1981). One reason for the
difficulty in controlling perjury are the conflicting ethical obligations of attorneys, who are
supposed to uphold the integrity of the judicial system while at the same time provide
zealous advocacy to their clients, some of whom choose to lie. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157, 166-70 (1986); Foster, The Devil's Advocate, 8 BULL. OF AM. AcAD. OF PSYCH.
& L. 229 (1980); Note, The Search for Truth, 55 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 310 (1987). See
generally S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
12. See J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 37-41.
13. Burdens of proof originated during the time of ordeal, battle, and wager of law.
[Vol. 64:301
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persuade the trier of fact that his version of the facts corresponds to
truth, and someone must bear the risk of nonpersuasion. 4 Failure to
persuade the trier of fact does not necessarily mean that one's position is
untrue; it means simply that the party has failed to convince the court of
its truth. 5 A procedural system ideally should resolve conflicts in such a
way that truth (to the extent it can be known) and persuasiveness corre-
spond more often than not.' 6
A second aspect of the conflict resolution goal of a procedural system
is justice, which is usually related to truth. But justice may also be related
to substantive rules that the court applies and to additional procedural
goals such as rule-making and behavior modification. If, for example, the
substantive rules that are applied strike most people as unjust, the result
that the procedural system achieves cannot be just, however accurately it
determines the past. One way to guard against this problem is to build
some flexibility into the procedural system. For example, judges have
considerable discretion in determining how the case will be litigated,
including such matters as consolidation and severance, 7 and the granting
of new trials when the jury has returned a verdict that the judge thinks
is not supported by the evidence. 8 Such procedural matters can affect the
substantive outcome of a case-and the parties' perception of the justice
See 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 603 (1923). At that time, they
determined who would be required, for example, to undergo the ordeal, or who would be
required to swear an oath. See id. See generally Shapiro, "To A Moral Certainty". Theories
of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Reid v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 39 Utah 617, 621, 118 P. 1009,
1010 (1911) ("[W]here . . . evidence . . . points with equal force to two things, one of
which renders the defendant liable and the other not, the plaintiff must fail."). See generally
Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation,
18 TULSA L.J. 79 (1982); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51 (1961); Winter, The
Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 L. & Soc. REv. 335, 339 (1971).
15. See J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 14-33.
16. It is undoubtedly impossible to achieve 100% correspondence in any system. But a
system that was wrong a significant amount of the time would not have the support of the
people it was serving. The level of error that can be tolerated is difficult, if not impossible,
to measure because, while we know the outcome of cases, we have no way of accurately
measuring error in those outcomes. The outcome itself is the best measure of truth. See J.
FRANK, supra note 3; Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, 127 (D. Lubin ed. 1983). For an attempt to construct a scientific measure
of the relative truth-finding abilities of adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Thibaut,
Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HAzv. L.
REv. 386 (1972). For a critique of that attempt, see Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and
Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083 (1975).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 42; see, e.g., Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013
(5th Cir. 1977); Kisteneff v. Tiernan, 514 F.2d 896, 897 (1st Cir. 1975); Stemler v. Burke,
344 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1965); Ammesmaki v. Interlake Steamship Co., 342 F.2d 627,
631 (7th Cir. 1965).
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(i); see, e.g., Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d
927, 930-31 (5th Cir. 1982); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 642-43 (10th Cir.
1962); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 352-53 (4th Cir. 1941).
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of the result. Some persons also argue that the jury is a safeguard against
injustice, in that it can ignore substantive rules it thinks are unjust, and
there is no effective sanction for its doing so.' 9
The conflict resolution goal is also related to two concepts that will
receive greater attention later in this section. The first of these is fair
adjudication: A goal of most adjudicatory systems is to resolve conflicts
fairly. Defining "fair adjudication" thus becomes important. The second
concept is social value: Adjudicatory systems reflect the values that mem-
bers of society share. In our adjudicatory system, as in our society,
individualism is one of the most prominent values that can be identified. 20
To some extent, the concepts of fair adjudication and social value are
related: The fairness of adjudication is often measured by the system's
ability to promote goals the society sees as important. 2'
2. Rule-making
A second goal of some procedural systems is rule-making. This goal is
particularly likely to be found in common law systems, where there is a
long tradition of judge-made legal rules. 22 In the American system, rules
are made by legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts.23 While
19. See J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 127-35. The idea, according to Frank, was first
proposed by Roscoe Pound and Wigmore. Frank castigates the idea as inherently tyrannical,
though he concedes that the jury was, especially in colonial times, an effective voice against
colonial authority. He contends, however, that the jury has outlived that justification.
20. See J. FaNrK, supra note 3, at 92; Alexander, Trial by Champion, 24 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 545 (1984); Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 306, 336 n.94 (1986); cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1713-16 (1976) (individualism as reflected in sub-
stantive law).
21. See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
22. See generally P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 115 (1987); T. SHAFFER, READINGS ON THE COMMON LAW 42-43 (1967); Watson, The
Future of the Common Law Tradition, 9 DALHOUSIE L.J. 67 (1984).
23. There is considerable current debate over the role of courts in rule-making. See,
e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 43-72 (1980); Bork,
The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823 (1986);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1971);
Neal, Robert Bork: Advocate of Judicial Restraint, 73 A.B.A. J. 82 (Sept. 1, 1987). Judicial
activism to protect constitutional rights and correct legislative "failure" traces its origins to
the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4(1938). See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-17 (1979). But such activism increased and altered dramatically with
the Warren Court. Id. at 2-3. On the role of the courts in formulating and implementing
social policy, see P. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES (1988); D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); see also G. HUGHES, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURTS 283-302
(1975) (legislative and executive failure as reason for increased judicial activism); Shapiro,
Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519 (1988).
Much of the commentary of so-called "strict constructionists" seems disingenuous given
[Vol. 64:301
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legislatures and administrative agencies are often viewed as the primary
rule-making bodies, it is undeniable that judges make rules as well. Indeed,
entire bodies of substantive law have grown out of judicial rule-making
in all the common law countries. 4 Even when judges are purportedly just
interpreting legislation, it is well-established that their interpretations are
final, barring subsequent legislative action.24
Judicial rule-making, however, is done in the context of a specific
conflict that must be resolved. It is not done in the rarefied atmosphere
of a legislative or administrative rule-making proceeding, where specific
applications of the rule must be imagined. The relationship of the rule-
making goal to the conflict resolution goal imposes some constraints on
judicial rule-making. For example, in some cases judges are reluctant to
apply a newly announced rule to the parties before them because the new
rule is such a drastic change from past practice that it is unfair to burden
the losing party with it.26 Despite such constraints, it is fair to say that
one goal of at least some procedural systems is to permit judicial rule-
making, either directly as with common law rules or indirectly in the guise
of interpretation, when such rule-making is necessary to resolve a particular
case before the court and can be done in a way that is fair to the parties.
3. Behavior Modification
A third goal of a procedural system is behavior modification. 27 Behavior
modification is, of course, significantly tied to the substantive legal rules
that are being applied, but the procedural system itself promotes this goal
by providing sanctions for behavior that is disapproved in the substantive
the long common law tradition of judicial rule-making and the willingness of many of them
to engage in judicial law-making when it promotes the social ends that they favor. See,
e.g., Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork,
Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1171, 1173 (1986). Even a conser-
vative judge has made this point. See Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant? The Case
Against Strict Constructionism, NEw REPUBUC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23.
24. These bodies of law include contracts, torts and property. See generally Cooter,
Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALF. L. REv. 1
(1985). Many of these bodies of law have been modified to some extent by legislation. See
generally Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 208-11 (1982).
25. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, THm INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 252-
53 (1975). See generally Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary,
7 HARv. J.L. & PUBL. POL'Y 87 (1984); Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on
Statutory Interpretation, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 1259 (1947) (discussing "judicial legislation"
that inevitably comes from statutory interpretation).
26. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971); Gibson v. United
States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987); Hawkins
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 504-05, 733 P.2d 1073, 1087-88, cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 212 (1987); E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 431 (1974); see also Levy, Realist Juris-
prudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 1 (1960) (a supportive look at
prospective overruling in the process of judicial lawmaking).
27. See Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 937 (1975).
19891
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rules. All procedural systems do this to some extent because substantive
rules that emerge from litigation, coupled with the likelihood of sanctions,
affect how non-parties behave in the future. Some systems, however, make
it easier for plaintiffs to seek such sanctions than do others. For example,
it may be economically inefficient for a single individual to vindicate his
rights in the courts because his losses are small-especially compared to
the losses that the potential defendant might suffer by being forced to
pay damages or modify his behavior. 28 But if the losses of all affected
individuals were measured against the potential defendant's gains, it might
well be more efficient, substantively, to force the defendant to change his
behavior. 29 A procedural rule makes this result possible. In the American
system, it is the class action rule.30 The existence and vitality of rules that
facilitate such joinder are a clue to the importance of a behavior modi-
fication goal. It is perhaps significant that the federal class action rule
was strengthened at the height of the civil rights movement.3'
The behavior modification goal, like the rule-making goal, is met only
in the context of a specific dispute. Unlike the rule-making goal, however,
behavior modification may be the primary purpose of the lawsuit. In other
words, the conflict to be resolved may be more a conflict over the
defendant's behavior in general than his behavior with respect to any
particular plaintiff.
B. The Elements of Fair Adjudication
Adjudication involves the presentation of a dispute to a decisionmaker
who has the authority to render a decision that is binding on the parties
to the dispute. All systems of adjudication that could be characterized as
"fair" must have certain additional features, whether the system is ad-
versarial or inquisitorial. First, the decisionmaker must be impartial. This
requirement helps to ensure that the decision is based on the merits of
the controversy and not on any bias-negative or positive-on the part of
the judge. It is probably impossible to eliminate bias entirely, simply
because judges are human and therefore have certain conscious and un-
conscious predilections.3 2 But a fair system will not permit judges (or
28. See generally B. WEISBROD WITH J. HANDLER & N. KomzsAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ch. 2 (1978) [hereinafter PUBnC INTEREST LAW].
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., FaD. R. Civ. P. 23. Most states have class action rules as well, many of
them modeled on the federal rule. See H. NEWBERG, 3 NEWBERO ON CLASS ACTIONS 3, 10,
11 (1985). See infra notes 154-194 and accompanying text.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note. However, changes in the rule did
not necessarily cause the proliferation of class action suits in the 1960's. See Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem,"
92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 670-71 (1979); see also Fiss, supra note 23.
32. See J. FRANK, supra note 3, at ch. X.
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jurors) to decide cases when they have an interest in the outcome of the
litigation or when there are other elements in their backgrounds that make
it difficult for them to be impartial."
The second feature of fair adjudication is that the decision rendered by
the court must have a rational basis. There are elements of irrationality
in all human institutions, of course, because we are not wholly rational
beings. But predictability, which is a feature of rational decisionmaking,
is essential to a fair system of adjudication. Our system of dispute
resolution must be reasonably predictable, or people will not know how
to order their affairs. No legal system is perfectly deterministic, however,
so predictability is never perfect. But people must be able to make some
reasonable calculation of the likely legal effect of their actions.3 4 Thus,
we have "substantive" rules governing behavior and "procedural" rules
governing the conduct of litigation, and the judge is expected to apply
those rules in rendering her decision. 35 The result, it is hoped, is that
people in similar situations will be treated similarly. A related feature of
predictability is the requirement that the decision be based on facts and
law that are presented and argued in open court; in other words, the
decisionmaker should have no hidden agenda. It should be possible to
make a reasonable prediction of the outcome by considering the facts and
law that were argued in court.3 6
33. Jurors, for example, are routinely removed if they have had experience with issues
similar to those that are the subject matter of the litigation or if they have biases that may
affect their ability to be fair. See, e.g., Flowers v. Flowers, 397 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965). See generally Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
34. The system may be more indeterminate when facts are at issue; there are simply too
many variables in litigating disputed facts. See J. FRANKs, supra note 3, at ch. III. Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) theorists advocate a less deterministic, standard-based (as opposed to
rule-based) system. See M. KELMAN, A GtrME TO CRITIcAL LEOAL. STrUDms 15-63 (1987). A
less deterministic system probably works best in a relatively homogenous society, where
there is broad agreement on standards. I disagree with CLS theorists who argue that rules
are completely indeterminate. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN.
L. REV. 473 (1984); Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEo. L.J. 1041 (1985); Yablon, The
Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6
CARDOzo L. Rv. 917 (1985). Several years of practice made it clear that attorneys can and
do make reasonable and accurate predictions of outcomes based on application of legal
rules to known facts. See, e.g., Belliotti, The Rule of Law and the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 24 U.W. ONT. L. REv. 67 (1988); Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S.
CAL. L. RaV. 1203 (1985); Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. Cm. L. REV. 462 (1987); Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HALv. L. REV. 332
(1986).
35. On the difficulty of distinguishing between substance and procedure, see materials
cited supra note 6.
36. I say "reasonable" prediction because of the impossibility of being certain. Most
practicing attorneys, when making predictions for their clients, deal in probabilities, and
explain carefully all the variables that can affect the outcome. In calculating probabilities,
attorneys assume that the decisionmaker considers only the evidence and legal argument
1989]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
A third feature of fair adjudication is that the parties to the dispute
have a voice in the adjudicative process. There are two reasons for this
requirement. First, a voice is needed because each party knows more about
his or her own case than anyone else and can be expected to bring forth
any favorable information that impartial investigators might overlook.
This rationale for a voice might be called the "information-based" ra-
tionale. Furthermore, each party has a stake in the outcome and is
motivated to bring all favorable information to the attention of the
decisionmaker. This rationale for a voice might be called the "motive-
based" rationale. Thus, giving the parties a voice helps to ensure that the
court has full information on which to base its decision.
A second reason for giving each party a voice is that it enhances the
individual dignity of the participants in the adjudicative process. Indeed,
in a society that values the autonomy of the individual, such a voice is
essential.3 7 It allows the party to participate in a decision that may affect
him profoundly. To ensure that the party's voice is effective, fair adju-
dication may also require a statement from the decisionmaker of the
reasons for his decision.38 This statement tells each party that the decision
was based on the relevant substantive and procedural rules, and that his
arguments were considered.
C. Social Values in Adjudication
The perceived need to give the parties a strong voice in the adjudicatory
process reflects social values going much beyond the adjudicatory system. 9
Many commentators have remarked on the strong individualism that is
reflected in the adversary system, which depends on the parties to define
and present the issues. 40 Some have also remarked that the opposite of
this individualism is a communitarian ideal, which calls for cooperation
rather than confrontation in resolving society's problems, including dis-
presented in court, but cannot always determine how (or whether) the decisionmaker received
the information or what his predilections are. See generally J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 14-
79.
37. Individual dignity is currently the primary justification given for the adversary system.
See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. For the disaffected, the alternative to voice
in any society that values the individual is exit. See generally A. HIRscHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND LOYALTY (1970). In a dispute resolution system, that probably means self-help-and
chaos.
38. See, e.g., Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353,
387-88 (1978).
39. See, e.g., E. HOEBL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 3-17 (1954); Cappelletti, Social
and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms and Trends in Western and Eastern
Europe, 69 MICH. L. REV. 847, 881-85 (1971). The adversary system reflects a distrust of
the institutions of government, which is the essence of the "American Creed." See S.
HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICs: THE PROMISE OF DIsHARMoNY 33-60 (1981).
40. See supra note 20.
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putes among its members.41 It is intuitively obvious that a society's system
of dispute resolution would reflect the relative importance of these two
"opposite" values. 42 Thus, it is not surprising that a strongly individualistic
society such as ours would have a system of dispute resolution that
emphasizes individual control and initiative.
Individualistic values can result in a highly creative society-one that
develops new ideas that contribute to the good of all. In an individualistic
system of litigation, that creative force is helpful to the case-by-case
development of legal doctrine: the common law. But individualism untem-
pered by communitarian values can lead to unremitting selfishness, in-
cluding an utter lack of concern for the consequences of one's action.
That selfishness could completely counter any creative value that individ-
ualism promoted.
Communitarian ideals can result in a society that is caring and supportive
of its members, ensuring that none goes without basic needs. Often,
however, communitarian ideals mean a kind of egalitarianism that removes
much of the incentive for individuals to be creative: If one's needs are
guaranteed, and there is little or no reward for outstanding effort, the
effort often will not be made. In the extreme, communitarian societies
may suppress the individual entirely, making the community the sole raison
d'etre for each member.
41. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 20. The conflict between individualism and commu-
nitarianism is a favorite theme of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) theorists, who seek to
"deconstruct" the dominant individualism in liberal democracies. See generally M. KELMAN,
supra note 34; R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). I draw on some
CLS scholarship in this article, but am more interested in achieving a balance of values
through evolution, rather than a revolutionary restructuring of society and its legal system.
Understanding the history and process of adjudication as well as the values reflected in a
particular system can help us guide that evolution. There is considerable recent literature
on legal evolution, though it focuses primarily on the evolution of substantive legal rules.
See, e.g., P. STEn, LEGAL EvoLUoN: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980); A. WATSON, THE
EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985); Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 CoLuM.
L. REV. 38 (1985).
42. I say intuitively, because I know of no objective attempt to relate those values to
the kind of dispute resolution system that has evolved. A system of adjudication, of course,
reflects many values in addition to these. Much of the debate over adversarial ideology,
however, seems to reduce to a debate over the relative importance of these two values. See
infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text; see also Mansbridge, Living With Conflict
Representation in the Theory of Adversary Democracy, 91 ETHICS 466 (1981) (adversarial
theory of political representation). See generally M. DAMAsKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND
STATE AUTHORITY (1986). Communitarian theorists argue that individuals are defined with
reference to a community and are not as autonomous as liberal theorists suppose. See, e.g.,
A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 216-20 (2d ed. 1984); M. SANDEL, LmERALsm AND THE LrmITs
OF JUSTICE 159-62 (1982); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 191-235 (1975); Kennedy,
supra note 20, at 1774; Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreward: Traces of Self-Government, 100




Each of these values has advantages to both individuals and society as
a whole; each can, in the extreme, be quite destructive. Very few societies
reflect the extremes of either value, but all lean in one direction or the
other. Because the society's system of adjudication reflects societal values,
significant changes in the system of adjudication probably reflect a shift
in societal values. Conversely, changes in the system of adjudication may
act as a catalyst for changes in society; the legal system can lead as well
as follow.
II. ADVERSARIAL IDEOLOGY
A. Adversarial and Inquisitorial Adjudication
Adversarial adjudication is often defined in tandem with its antithesis,
inquisitorial adjudication. The comparison helps to illustrate the relation-
ship between the system of adjudication a society uses and the values it
emphasizes.
1. Elements of Adversarial Adjudication
An adversary system of adjudication, as generally defined, has two
essential elements.4 3 First, the parties themselves are responsible for gath-
ering and presenting evidence and arguments on behalf of their positions.
Second, the decisionmaker knows nothing of the litigation until the trial,
when the parties present their neatly packaged cases to him. These elements
are related to some of the elements of fair adjudication identified above.
Party control over the development and presentation of the case clearly
satisfies the requirement that the parties have a voice in the litigation. It
gives effect to both the information-based rationale and the motive-based
rationale, and it helps ensure the autonomy of the individual. One diffi-
culty, as many critics have noted, is that it may give too much effect to
the motive-based rationale: The parties may simply have too much incentive
to hide or distort evidence." Another problem is that the parties may be
quite unequal in resources or skill. Adversary theory tends to ignore this
inequality, though many non-adversarial elements have evolved to help
equalize the parties.4 5
43. These elements are repeatedly identified in the commentary. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN,
supra note 2, at 1-6; Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW (H. Berman
ed. 1961); Schwartz, The Zeal of the Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER 153 (D. Lubin ed.
1983).
44. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 842.
45. See infra section III.B. for a discussion of some of those equalizing elements.
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The requirement that the decisionmaker know nothing of the case until
the parties present it is related to the requirement that the decisionmaker
be impartial. Adversary theorists worry that a judge who has taken an
active role in the development of the case might come to a decision too
early and, consciously or unconsciously, stop looking for evidence or
argument contrary to his conclusion. 46 The passive decisionmaker may also
help make the litigation more predictable: If the decisionmaker is confined
to reasoning from admissible evidence presented by the parties in open
court, the parties, who control the evidence, can predict the outcome
somewhat better than if they must wait to see what inquiries the decision-
maker pursues. 47
This system is highly individualistic. It gives both control and respon-
sibility to the individuals who are most interested in the result and takes
advantage of their self-interest in complete and creative argument. 48 It
seeks a solution by enabling the litigants to seek their own self-interest
without regard for others; indeed, it expects them to argue selfishly. It is
also open to the problems associated with extreme individualism: When
an individual argues selfishly, he may be more motivated to hide or distort
evidence. 49 Two people arguing selfishly may cast the dispute in terms of
their own self-interest but fail to articulate a reasonable societal view.
2. Elements of Inquisitorial Adjudication
Inquisitorial adjudication is generally cast as the opposite of adversarial
adjudication. Thus, two essential elements of inquisitorial adjudication
are: first, that the judge is primarily responsible for supervising the
gathering of evidence necessary to resolve the issue; and, second, that the
decisionmaker is not, therefore, merely a receptor for information at a
neatly packaged trial, but is, instead, an active participant. In practice,
46. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 16, at 1091-92, 1105; Fuller, supra note 43. For an
effort to test this proposition, see Thibaut, Walker & Lind, supra note 16. For a critique
of the test, see Damaska, supra note 16.
47. On the distortion effects of active judicial inquiry in an adversarial jury trial, see
Frankel, supra note 2, at 1042-43. See also Frankel, The Adversary Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv.
465 (1976). One commentator favors freer judicial inquiry in bench trials than in jury trials.
See Uviller, supra note 7, at 1069 n.l.
48. In reality, the control and responsibility may fall largely to advocates, whose
motivations are quite different. Legal ethics codes requiring zealous advocacy are designed
to ensure that the advocate gives his maximum effort to the client's interest in prevailing.
See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESsIoNAL REsPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1980); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 673.
49. This may especially be a problem when professional advocates have the primary
responsibility for argument. Not always knowing how selfish the client wants to be, an
advocate can assume the extreme and proceed on that basis. Advocates, in their ethically
required zeal, may push the client to extremes that the client would not otherwise choose.
See, e.g., Simon, supra note 2, at 52-59.
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an inquisitorial "trial" such as is found in continental Europe may
continue as a series of hearings for several months as the judge considers
what further information he might need to resolve the dispute.5 0 At these
hearings, the parties offer suggestions about further avenues for investi-
gation, witnesses to examine, and so on.51 They do not, however, present
their own witnesses; indeed, they generally do not interview witnesses in
advance. 52
To some extent, the impartiality of the judge is guaranteed in much the
same way as in adversarial adjudication: Judges with an interest in the
outcome may not be involved in the case.53 But inquisitorial systems
require the judge to be involved in fact investigation, which adversarial
apologists argue could result in prejudgment and a lack of due diligence
in pursuing opposing facts. 54 Perhaps for this reason, inquisitorial systems
have additional checks to counter this kind of bias in the decisionmaker.
One is the opportunity that the parties have to suggest avenues of inves-
tigation-in other words, parties in inquisitorial systems have a substantial
voice in the proceedings, even though they do not control the investigation
and presentation of evidence. 55 Another check is the fact that inquisitorial
systems generally have at least one level of de novo review, so that any
fact missed by the original judge may be brought forth on review.5 6
Because the parties are participating with the judge in the investigation of
the case, and because there are substantive and procedural rules in in-
quisitorial systems, the outcome should be at least as predictable and
rational as ih an adversarial system.5 7
50. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 828. See generally J. MtRYMAN, THE CIvIL
LAw TRADITION 111-23 (2d ed. 1985); Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German
Civil Procedure I, 71 HAsv. L. REv. 1193 (1958).
51. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 826-30.
52. Id. at 833-35. Damaska, supra note 16, at 1088-89.
53. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 455 (1982); Davis & Levin, Disqualifying Judges, LITIGATION,
Winter 1981, at 11; Kilgarlin & Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, 17 ST.
MARY's L.J. 599 (1986); Note, Disqualification of Federal District Court Judges for Bias
or Prejudice: Problems, Problematic Proposals and a Proposed Procedure, 46 AtB. L. REV.
229 (1981); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 736 (1973). On recusal in European Systems, see C. PR. crv. Arts. 341-55 (French
Code of Civil Procedure); ZPO 41.42 (West German Code of Civil Procedure). See generally
Brouwer, Inquisitorial and Adversary Procedures-A Comparative Analysis, 55 AusTL. L.J.
207 (1981); Slovenks, "Je Recuse!": The Disqualification of a Judge, 19 LA. L. Rav. 644
(1959).
54. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
55. At least one commentator argues that the German system, generally characterized as
inquisitorial like other continental systems, is really adversarial, and that the only difference
between the German system and our own is in the degree of party participation. Langbein,
supra note 2.
56. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 856-57. See generally Kaplan, von Mehren &
Schaefer, supra note 50.
57. The substantive rules in civil law systems are codified. See J. MERRYmAN, supra note
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Inquisitorial systems of adjudication are more communitarian than
individualistic in nature. The goal is to seek the socially correct solution
to the litigants' dispute by demanding cooperation among court and
litigants in the development of evidence and argument.58 In theory, less
importance is given to individual self-interest, though fair adjudication
requires that inquisitorial systems allow individuals to argue their self-
interest. Nevertheless, the judge, with a broader, disinterested perspective,
has a relatively free hand in pursuing investigations and is not confined
to considering only the parties' interests and arguments.
3. Comparison of Adversarial and Inquisitorial Theory
We have already seen that several checks exist in inquisitorial systems
to ensure that the inquisitorial judge remains impartial throughout the
process.5 9 The adversary system, with its division of responsibility, does
not have so great a need for such checks. 60 The potential for distortion
of evidence in the adversary system has also been noted, however, and it
means that checks are needed in the adversary system as well. Indeed, the
distorting effects of the motive-based rationale are probably the primary
reason for a number of non-adversarial checks that are evolving in the
adversary system. 61
Inquisitorial theory does not require that the parties participate in the
investigation of facts because that task belongs to the judge. But fair
adjudication requires it, and all fair inquisitorial systems encourage the
parties to offer suggestions. 62 Thus, while party participation is not nec-
essarily an inherent feature of inquisitorial theory, it exists in reality.
50, at 26-33. Perhaps for historical reasons, civil law systems generally have inquisitorial
systems of adjudication, while common law systems generally have adversary systems of
adjudication. The adversarial debate format is probably well-suited for common law devel-
opment of legal doctrine. See infra section IV.
58. See Damaska, supra note 16, at 1103-04 (systematic social reality more important
than details of case in continental systems).
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The problem of a single person being
responsible for both fact-finding and decisionmaking is a troublesome one in administrative
law, where the fact-investigators and the fact-finders sometimes overlap. American admin-
istrative law generally requires a separation of function within an agency even if the agency
is charged with both investigative and adjudicative functions. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO &
P. VERKuiL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROcEss 502-05 (1985).
60. Adversarial judges may also decide cases too quickly. Such quick decisions may
affect evidentiary rulings, instructions to juries, or the decision itself if there is no jury.
There is anecdotal evidence that quick decisions are sometimes made in adversarial adjudi-
cation. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 168-69. In addition, the writer once participated
in a case in which the judge clearly had made up his mind after opening statements. It took
a Herculean effort just to get permission to present evidence and arguments, and it was not
at all clear that the judge listened to them.
61. A number of these are described in detail infra section III.B.
62. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 826-30.
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Conversely, adversarial adjudication may overemphasize party control to
the point of distortion. Some commentators argue that inquisitorial ad-
judication offers a better balance of tasks than does adversarial adjudi-
cation because it gives the parties a significant voice but gives them
considerably less opportunity to hide or distort evidence.63
Finally, the requirement of a rational basis for the decision is not really
an inherent part of either adversarial or inquisitorial theory. In fact,
however, each system has both substantive and procedural rules, which
the judges must follow, and outcomes in each system are reasonably
predictable. Indeed, in continental European systems, where judges are
not former lawyers but are professional judges trained to the task, 64 a
judge's advancement and standing will depend upon the quality both of
his investigations and of the justification for his decisions.65
Both adversarial and inquisitorial adjudication can be fair adjudication.
Both have built-in biases that must be adjusted for. But the checks that
the two systems have to counter their inherent biases probably make the
two systems more similar than theory would suggest. 66
B. An Evaluation of Adversarial Ideology
The adversary system has vociferous critics as well as passionate de-
fenders. This section focuses on the two principal justifications that have
been offered for adversarial adjudication. The arguments for and against
adversarial adjudication center around the two principal justifications.
1. Truth
The first justification is that the adversary system is the best system for
determining the truth.67 When each side presents its best case, the deci-
63. See generally Langbein, supra note 2.
64. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 50, at 34-38; Langbein, supra note 2, at 848-55.
Special training for judges has been proposed in this country as well. See J. FRANK, supra
note 3, at ch. XVII. See generally MODERN JuDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION: A SELECTED AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 329-32 (R. Fremlin ed. 1973) (bibliography on judicial training).
65. A corps of professional judges whose advancement depends upon their work could
result in a very dependent judiciary, one that was unwilling to render decisions contrary to
the prevailing political mood. The propensity for judicial lawmaking in the United States,
however, seems to be due less to adversarial adjudication than to other features of our system, such
as constitutional guarantees of an independent judiciary and a common law tradition of judicial
lawmaking. Adversarial argument can, however, make the points for and against a significant
legal development crisper and clearer.
66. Inquisitorial and adversarial systems have been converging, in part to counter the
biases described here. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 825, 858-66. The movement that
is taking place in inquisitorial systems, however, is not the subject of this article. While
similar observations could probably be made about inquisitorial systems, I will not be
making them. See generally M. DAmAsKA, supra note 42.
67. See J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 80; S. LANDsMAN, supra note 2, at 36; Freedman,
Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1065 (1975); Luban, Calming
the Hearse Horse, supra note 2, at 468-69.
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sionmaker has all the information he needs to reach a just result. When
presentation of the case is left in the hands of the parties, the information-
and motive-based rationales both suggest that each side will, indeed,
present its best case.
Paradoxically, then, the principal criticism of the adversary system is
that it masks the "truth. ' 68 Truth is, of course, difficult to ascertain if
only because people may view truth differently depending on their back-
grounds, interests, and perspectives. But, as we have seen, adversarial
adjudication encourages people actively to cover up facts that could lead
to a more accurate portrayal of truth. 69 The result could be that infor-
mation relevant to the decision is kept from the decisionmaker. In theory,
discovery rules are supposed to alleviate this problem. 70 But discovery
itself has become a weapon in the adversary arsenal and may not accom-
plish the lofty goals that the rules envision. 7'
There has been some attempt to determine empirically whether the
adversary system does, indeed, promote that uncovering of truth.72 Despite
these valiant efforts, however, it is unlikely that an accurate empirical
study can ever be done. Truth itself is difficult to define73 and even more
difficult to ascertain. There are both factual and legal elements in any
adjudication, so that a determination of liability may reflect a factual
determination, or a view of the proper application of law, or even a
community standard only vaguely related to the facts and the law. Ad-
judication is much more than determining facts, as the discussion of the
goals of a procedural system should demonstrate. 74
2. Individual Dignity
Perhaps for all of these reasons, some of the most passionate defenders
of the adversary system now focus on another justification, all but aban-
doning the truth theory. That new justification is the preservation of
individual dignity.75 This theory says that the adversary system best pre-
serves the autonomy of the individual by allowing him free rein in making,
68. See, e.g., J. FaNK, supra note 3, at ch. VI.
69. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 842.
70. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1298-99 (1978).
71. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 16.
73. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 6-31 and accompanying text. See generally J. FRANK, supra note 3.
75. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 37; M. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 9-24.
One difficulty in justifying the adversary system may stem from some confusion about
whether we are justifying a fact-finding procedure or a law-finding procedure. The problems
with the "truth" justification suggest that fact-finding is not the adversary system's strength.
See Langbein, supra note 2, at 841-48.
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his case to the court. Only by giving the litigants the fullest voice possible
can individual dignity be preserved. Indeed, Landsman argues that a
preoccupation with truth may be "dangerous," in that truth-seekers may
find it appropriate to use torture and other devices to find the "truth.' '76
Several aspects of adversarial adjudication, he argues, help to check this
tendency, including party control of litigation, the requirement of zealous
advocacy, 77 and a strict evidentiary code.7 1
This argument is a strong statement of support for individualism. In
other words, it is a statement of value more than a statement about the
adversary system itself. There is nothing wrong with arguing about values,
but it is helpful to understand what we are doing. The adversary system
is a highly individualistic system of adjudication, but the more commu-
nitarian inquisitorial systems seem to work equally well in modern practice,
and without unduly compromising individual dignity. Perhaps we should
ask whether it makes sense to employ an individualistic, confrontational
system for resolving disputes. Casting the parties as adversaries doing
battle to protect their respective interests makes one kind of statement
about the dignity and worth of the individual; casting them as people with
a problem that needs to be resolved with outside help makes another kind
of statement about individual dignity. The argument seems to be about
which is the more valid statement.7 9
Additionally, it is not clear that the adversary system preserves individual
dignity. One lay critic of the adversary system has focused on a problem
that practitioners have seen from another perspective: the litigant's loss
76. S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 37. This argument seems to me to be a red herring.
There is nothing about inquisitorial adjudication that leads inevitably to torture, in spite of
the unfortunate associations the term conjures up. Rather, torture seems to have been
mainly a function of narrow evidentiary rules on the continent. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 659-60. Indeed, torture has occurred in English law as well.
See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 126. Civilized societies recognize that torture is
neither acceptable nor likely to produce truth.
77. Strictly speaking, this is part of the ideology of advocacy rather than the adversary
system itself. The distinction is important for clear thinking on the problem of adversarial
adjudication. Advocacy is an important part of all adjudication in our specialized world,
but arguments about advocacy and ethics need to be separated from the strictly procedural
aspects of adversarial adjudication if the process is to be understood and evaluated cogently.
Landsman, like many commentators, tends to confuse the theory of adversarial adjudication
with the trappings that have grown up around it. See generally Hazard, The Advocate's
Duty, 16 GA. L. REv. 821 (1982); Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients and the Adversary System,
37 MERCER L. REv. 647 (1986); Simon, supra note 2.
78. S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 39. The evidentiary code also does not seem to be
an essential part of adversarial theory.
79. The way I have stated the problem undoubtedly tips my hand. I would prefer a less
confrontational system for resolving disputes. It makes more sense to encourage people
involved in a dispute to back off from the battle so that, eventually, they can learn to sit
down together and resolve their differences more amicably. Recognition of this may be one
reason for the recent growth of alternative dispute resolution, which is less confrontational.
See infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
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of control to the attorney who represents her.80 This loss of control can
cause considerable anger, and it is a principal reason for the elaborate
and often bizarre system of ethics under which lawyers operate.8 This
loss of individual control is hardly consistent with either individual dignity
or an individualistic ethic. 82
The criticisms that have been leveled against the adversary system reflect
symptoms of a deeper malaise-one that has not yet been sufficiently
analyzed. Indeed, like Simon's "ideology of advocacy," the adversary
system seems to be a phenomenon in search of justification. The justifi-
cations shift over time, but the basic phenomenon remains unexamined.
But it is not only the justifications that shift over time; our present system
of dispute resolution sometimes looks quite unlike a theoretically pure
adversary system. How we arrived at this system and where we are likely
going with it are examined next.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
A. Early History
1. Starting Points
Most early histories of civil procedure concentrate on the transition,
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, from ancient, irrational modes
80. See A. STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL (1977); see also Simon, supra note 2. The existence
of a professional elite of attorneys has also been identified as a cause of inequality in the
administration of justice. See, e.g., J. AUEBRACK, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 10, 12 (1976); Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
81. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (1980); ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (M. Davis & F. Elliston eds. 1986);
THE GOOD LAwYER (D. Luban ed. 1984).
82. The adversary system is also frequently criticized on the ground that it causes
unnecessary delays in litigation. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 34-36; Miller,
supra note 2. With the pace of litigation largely in the hands of the litigators, it was often
possible for a party, usually the defendant, to delay the resolution of the issue for years,
by which time any compensation paid to the plaintiff had lost considerable value. Recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to give the judge more
discretion in preventing or dealing with delaying tactics. These include more authority over
pre-trial conferences and discovery conferences, including the authority to set time limits,
FED. R. Civ. P. 16, and more authority to impose sanctions on recalcitrant lawyers and
their clients. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26, 27. Landsman argues that contentions that the
adversary system delays litigation may be inaccurate, and suggests that delay may be
attributable to other causes. S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 34-36. In any event, he says,
delay is related to the fact that the parties are heard in full, and that is a good thing. Id.;
see also Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 734 (1987) (reply to Langbein, supra note 2).
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of proof to the jury "trial." 8 3 The adversary system, however, has many
sources, and a broader perspective is needed. Nevertheless, several aspects
of early procedure are starting points for the development of adversarial
adjudication.
a. Party Control and the Passive Decisionmaker
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the parties were primarily
responsible for commencing litigation (including criminal actions) 4 and
for defining the issue through pleadings.8 5 They also had some control
over selecting the mode of proof.8 6 Selecting the mode of proof was
important because the proof itself was irrational and difficult to control;
the power to select the most advantageous mode of proof was therefore
critical.
The ancient modes of proof were ordeal, battle, and wager of law. All
employed an oath to invoke the judgment of God. In ordeal, the party
who had the burden of proof8 7 was required to swear an oath, then submit
to some test, such as holding a red-hot iron rod for a prescribed time; if
the iron did not burn him, his case was proved.88 In battle, the litigant
challenged his adversary to battle, though champions were often used to
perform the actual fight in civil cases.8 9 The winner of the battle, who
had also sworn an oath, thereby proved his case. Wager of law depended
on oaths by the litigant and his "suitors," who swore to the truth of his
story. 90 If the litigant and his suitors performed their oaths, which were
difficult and elaborate, without error, the litigant proved his case.9' In
wager of law, the oath was everything; the penalty for a false oath was
thought to be eternal damnation.9 2 No matter which ancient mode of
83. See, e.g., 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 598-674; T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 6, at 379-418.
84. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 604-05.
85. See id. at 598-620; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 399-418.
86. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 603-10.
87. Pollock and Maitland say that assignment of the burden of proof was the only
rational element in the process. Id. at 603.
88. While this sounds like an impossible test, there is evidence that the party who
suffered the ordeal prevailed about half the time. Id. at 599 n.1. The ordeal has ancient
origins and was a widespread primitive means of proof. See generally Glotz, The Ordeal
and the Oath, in 2 PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONs 609-20 (A. Kocourek & J.
Wigmore eds. 1915).
89. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 600, 632-33; T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 6, at 116-17.
90. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 600-01, 634-36; T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 6, at 115-16.
91. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 600-01.
92. See id. at 600.
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proof was employed, failure to "prove" one's case after taking an oath
could lead to perjury charges. 93
Superficially, these ancient modes of "proof ' 94 seem to provide the
ultimate in party control. The outcome depended entirely on the physical
strength, stamina, intelligence, or self-control of the party.9 5 But the
ultimate decisionmaker was assumed to be God, and the parties and the
court had to rely heavily on clergy for the invocation of God's power and
for the interpretation of his signs. This reliance on clergy left considerable
power in the hands of human interpreters, for whom there was no test of
either impartiality or passivity.9 6 Because of the clergy's power, party
control itself was undermined.
The ancient modes of proof began to fall into disuse in the thirteenth
century. The Lateran Council of 1215 forbade clergy from participating
in ordeal; 97 because their participation in seeking the guidance of God had
been important, ordeal virtually disappeared after the ban. Battle continued
in the form of duels, which were not banned in England until 1819,98 but
battle, too, became less significant during the thirteenth century.9 9 And
wager of law, with its elaborate ritual and risk of loss after the slightest
misstep, had always been so difficult that litigants had often taken their
chances with the hot iron. 1°° Thus, litigants were ready for a new mode
of proof.
As these ancient modes of proof declined during the thirteenth century,
the precursor of the modern jury trial began to gain ascendance. Originally
termed an inquest "by the country," this mode of proof required the
sheriff to summon a number of freemen of the county who had some
knowledge of the facts or who were required to inquire about the facts
before coming together to serve as a jury.10' Thus, these jurors were not
93. Id.
94. The ancient modes of proof were not, of course, proof in the modern sense. There
was no rational examination of evidence; indeed, the only "evidence" relied upon was the
supposed judgment of God.
95. In the case of wager of law, it also depended on his ability to find suitors who could
get through the elaborate oath. The theory, of course, was that the proof was out of the
party's control and in the hands of God. But the party, in some sense, exposed his body
(or his soul) to the judgment of God.
96. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 599 n.2; T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 6, at 115. There is some tendency in the literature to confuse impartiality with passivity.
See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 2-4. The two concepts must be distinguished. A
judge can be impartial but very active in developing the case, as judges are in continental
inquisitorial systems. Impartiality is a requirement for fair adjudication, but judicial passivity
is not. Those who confuse the two ideas betray a bias in favor of adversarial adjudication.
97. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 599.
98. Id. at 641.
99. See id. at 632.
100. Id. at 601. Nevertheless, wager of law was favored by some and "was not finally
abolished until 1833." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 116.
101. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 621-22.
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passive receptors of pre-packaged information presented at trial, as modern
jurors are; rather, they were active inquirers who were, themselves, re-
quired to take an oath. Their resulting "findings" often amounted to
"retailfing] the gossip of the countryside."10 2 They were more like witnesses
than passive fact-finders. 0 3 Similarly, the judges actively questioned wit-
nesses, examining, for example, a litigant's suitors to ensure that they
were not interested parties and, that they really knew something about the
facts.' °4 Even the jury, then, did not preserve party control through the
proof stage. Nevertheless, the jury became a popular substitute for other
modes of proof, and by the middle of the thirteenth century, it was the
predominant mode of proof. 05 In part, this practice may be a testament
to the uncertainties in the other modes of proof.
b. Legal Profession
Litigants in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had a good deal of
help. Pleading was complex even then, and a strong legal profession was
already in existence to help litigants through that stage of the proceed-
ings. 06 Pleading was, as noted above, an important part of the proceedings.
Not only did it determine the issue to be decided, but it helped determine
the burden of proof and the mode of proof. °7 Assistance was also available
at the proof stage. Those litigants who were forced to undergo the ordeal'08
could turn to people who advised them on how to enhance their chances
of prevailing. 0 9 Those who selected battle could sometimes hire champions
to fight for them," 0 and a large-and disreputable-company of such
champions developed."' It is easy to see how the lawyers, with their
rational approach to pleading, would ultimately take over the proof stage
102. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 124.
103. This tradition of non-professional jurors may be a factor in the development of the
adversary system. Because the jurors' primary responsibilities lie elsewhere, the system needs
to make minimal demands on their time. A single-event trial at which the fact-finder merely
listens to the evidence and decides the matter is well-suited to the use of such non-professional
fact-finders. A more inquisitorial approach probably would not work well.
104. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 609-10. This questioning went to
the suitor's qualifications and not to the evidence as such. At this time in history, there
was little concept of evidence as a basis for decision.
105. Id. at 641.
106. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 216-23. Pleading at this time was the "central
stage" in the process. Id. at 399.
107. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 602-11.
108. The ordeal was primarily reserved for those charged with a criminal act. See id. at
603.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 633; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 116-17. Champions could not be
used in criminal cases. See id. at 116.
Ill. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 633; A. STRICK, supra note 80,
at 30-31.
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of litigation as well, when that stage, too, came to be seen as a rational
process."12
c. The Common Law
The common law was a strong tradition even in the thirteenth century."'
That strength was a factor in England's resistance to the movement toward
codification. While most of continental Europe adopted classical Roman
law in a movement known as the Reception,1 1 4 England retained its
customary law, resisting both the ancient Roman ideas and the process of
codification. With case-by-case legal development, there was, perhaps,
more of a need for a debate format in the adjudicative process. By
contrast, in continental Europe the debate over the shape of the law took
place more clearly in the bodies that codified the law, and judges were
viewed more as law-appliers than as law-makers.115
2. Additional Conceptual Developments
The starting points for the development of the adversary system, then,
were all in place by the end of the thirteenth century. There existed a
modicum of party control over the litigation process, a strong legal
profession, and a tradition of customary, or common law development
that was strong enough to resist later pressure to codify. All these factors
were important in the formation of the adversary system, but several
additional elements helped the adversary system solidify in England and
its daughter countries. 116
112. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that lawyers
prefer not only adversarial adjudication, but complex legal rules and common law devel-
opment as well, because those institutions are professionally advantageous to them. See
Galanter, supra note 80, at 119. Galanter also points out, however, that legal professionals
such as ours, that tend to be advantageous to the "haves," also have room for "agents of
change," professionals who identify with have-nots and press their claims. Id. at 151.
113. On the development of the common law, see S. MiLsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
oF THE CommoN LAw (2d ed. 1981).
114. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 43-44.
115. There is considerable current debate over the proper role of judges. See supra note
23. It appears, however, that judicial law-making and adversarial adjudication go hand in
hand.
116. There may be other factors in the development of adversarial adjudication as well.
For example, the growth of a non-professional jury, ideally suited to a single-event trial,
may be a factor. See supra note 103. The developments I identify in this subsection were
important in continental Europe as well, and certainly had an impact on the development
of inquisitorial systems of adjudication. I am, however, concerned here only with their
relationship to adversarial adjudication. It is the relationship between these developments
and the starting points identified above that led to the adversary system. If the premises
are different, we should expect these developments to have a different impact.
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Two of these were broad-based political and philosophical movements
and two were refinements of legal thinking. The first broad movement
was the rise of democratic principles and institutions. While this movement
is traceable at least to the Magna Carta in 1215, democratic principles
were refined over a period of many centuries. The critical principle for
adversarial adjudication is the principle of individual autonomy. The
adversary system is a highly individualistic system of adjudication. 17 It
depends on individual autonomy and initiative because it places the burden
of developing and presenting the case on the individual who is interested
in the outcome. Without a democratic ideal that honored the dignity and
autonomy of the individual, the adversary system could not have worked.
The second broad movement was the rise of scientific method in phi-
losophy.11 8 Parts of the legal process in England had always been rational,
of course. Common law development is highly rational, moving step by
step, analyzing small differences in cases and determining the likely social
impact of a given decision.119 Even the jury trial had an element of rational
investigation in it: The jury was supposed to investigate the facts and
determine the right result. But until the rise of science in the seventeenth
century, the notion of systematic evaluation of physical and testimonial
evidence was not strong.1 20 Such philosophers as Descartes and Spinoza
helped demonstrate how to reason from physical evidence.' 2' The signifi-
cance of this movement for judicial procedure is great. The notion that
there is an objective truth that can be discovered through reason is quite
different from the irrational ancient modes of proof, which appealed to
magic-if the right formula is used, or the right ordeal is prescribed, or
if God is invoked properly, there is no need to think through the factual
evidence. 22 Rather, God and the system will provide the answer. The
modem adversary system still has magical elements, 23 but it is essentially
a rational system. It depends on proof being presented by the two sides,
and on a judge's or jury's power to reason from the evidence to a
conclusion. 24 A belief in reason's power to tame the evidence is, therefore,
a factor in the development of adversarial adjudication.
117. J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 92.
118. See generally B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 525-40 (1945); MAIN
CURRENTS OF WESTERN THOUGHT 249-354 (F. Baumer ed. 1970). This may be more important
in continental systems, where a rational social order is more openly sought. See Damaska,
supra note 16, at 1104-05.
119. For an illuminating example of the rationality of common law development, see
Fuller, supra note 38, at 375-77.
120. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 130-31 (1926).
121. See generally 31 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, (R. Hutchins ed. 1952)
(Descartes and Spinoza).
122. See generally 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 120, at 126-44.
123. J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 37-61.
124. I do not mean to suggest that other adjudicatory systems are irrational. The
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This discussion leads us to the two legal ideas that aided in the devel-
opment of the adversary system. The first of these ideas is the distinction
between law and fact. Early modes of proof made no such distinction,
but simply asked which of the two parties should win. 125 But the distinction
started to appear quite early, 2 6 with a division of authority in jury trials
whereby juries decided facts, and judges decided law. 27 Dividing authority
between judge and jury is still the primary reason for making the distinc-
tion. 28 There is no hint that fact and law are different enough to require
different treatment. But arguments about law and fact are different. An
argument about fact is about what happened at some time in the past;
proof is presented, and the trier of fact must reconstruct the past from
that proof. An argument about law, on the other hand, is about what
rule ought to apply to the situation that has been proved. It does not
involve proof, but is, to some extent, a debate about the structure of
society and its institutions. To the extent that the structure evolves through
legal institutions, as it does in all common law countries, that debate is
an important one and has been for centuries. That the debate format has
been co-opted for fact-finding may be an aberration: It is, simply, a
different kind of problem and requires a different kind of analysis. 29
The second legal development that aided formation of the adversary
system was the substance-procedure distinction, which is identified pri-
inquisitorial system also depends on reason, and probably values "scientific" adjudication
more highly than does the adversary system. See Damaska, supra note 16, at 1104-05. It
might be said that no modem system of adjudication could develop without a faith in the
power of reason.
125. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 602; J. FRANK, supra note 3,
at 41.
126. See T. PLucKNETT, supra note 6, at 417-18.
127. Id. This left the decision on the law in the hands of the sovereign or his representative.
128. See, e.g., Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 382 (1913). See generally
James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949). There
is considerable current debate about the jury's fact-finding competence in complex matters
such as antitrust disputes. Compare In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069 (3rd Cir. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part following summary judgment, 723 F.2d
238, 319 (3rd Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) with In re United
States Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). See
generally Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH.
L. REv. 68 (1981); Loo, A Rationale for an Exception to the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Jury Trial: In re Japanese Electronics Antitrust Litigation, 30 CLav. ST. L. Rv. 647
(1981); The Jury in Complex Litigation, 65 JUDicATURE 393 (1982); Note, Complex Jury
Trials, Due Process, and the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Complexity, 18 CoLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PRoas. 1 (1983); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92
HAv. L. REv. 898 (1979).
129. Fact-finding is not pure, as I recognized earlier in this paper. See supra notes 7-16
and accompanying text. It does sometimes involve debate and persuasion. But, as I also
noted earlier, a goal of fair conflict resolution is to make truth and persuasiveness coincide
as often as possible. Id. Adversarial fact-finding may make that goal harder to reach. See
Langbein, supra note 2, at 841-48.
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marily with Blackstone in the eighteenth century. 130 It is not surprising
that modern adversarial theory and practice consolidated shortly after
that.13 1 The substance-procedure distinction was important for the devel-
opment of the adversary system because it elevates the role of procedure
and, therefore, makes devising and justifying the right procedure that
much more important. The "right" procedure will produce the "right"
result. The system becomes God, and it is the system that is invoked to
answer the substantive question about who should win. The adversary
system is not an inevitable result of the substance-procedure distinction,
but in combination with the other developments described here, it was the
most logical kind of procedural system to appear in England and other
common law countries.
The factors that came together to produce an adversarial system of
adjudication, then, are: The tradition of party control over some aspects
of adjudication; the strong legal profession that would naturally gravitate
to a system that increased that control, thereby giving the parties and
their attorneys more power; the democratic and individualistic ideals that
grew in England, which would naturally lead to an individualistic system
of dispute resolution; 32 the growing faith in reason in decisionmaking,
including faith in the ability of reason to tame the facts; and the growing
faith in procedure as a magical substitute for God. The adversary system
is seen as a mode of proof, but one thesis of this article is that its use as
a mode of proof is not entirely consistent with its fundamental character
as a debate.
B. Non-Adversarial Elements in Modern Litigation
Many recent innovations in procedure have substantially modified the
adversary system. These modifications have not been uniform. The adver-
sary system remains more robust in some forms of litigation than others.
Complex litigation, involving multiple parties or difficult scientific or
social issues, is the area where the adversary system has undergone the
most significant modification. The reasons, which are more fully developed
130. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 381-82.
131. See S. LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 7; cf. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 123-34 (1983)
(development of adversary system in criminal law). Until this distinction was made, substance
and procedure had been tied together in the forms of action. It is not surprising that soon
after this distinction was made, the forms of action were finally abolished in England, see
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 375, and a uniform procedure for all common law actions
was developed.
132. Several commentators have noted the close relationship between adversarial modes
of proof and an individualistic society. See, e.g., J. FRANJK, supra note 3, at 92; Damaska,
supra note 16, at 1103-06; Elliott, supra note 20, at 336 n.94.
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later,"' center largely on the need for a manager in such litigation-a task
that often falls by default to the judge. 13 4 The adversary system has also
been significantly modified in family law, where "alternative dispute
resolution" is prominent.'35 In family law, it is thought that adversarial
procedure merely increases the contentious behavior of people who must,
ultimately, be able to work together, and that adversarial dispute resolution
is therefore inappropriate. 3 6 Adversarial fact-finding also fails significantly
in complex litigation, and some non-adversarial elements have developed
to remedy that problem. This section examines in detail some of these
recent innovations, showing how they are non-adversarial, and evaluating
how well they promote fair adjudication as defined in Section I.B.
1. Discovery
Discovery is the generic term for a number of procedures for obtaining
information from one's opponent in litigation. 137 Together, these discovery
devices enable the parties to learn the facts that the other side knows, 38
thereby equalizing the information that the parties possess. In a sense, it
is an admission that the assumption of equality behind adversarial theory
is unfounded; to overcome the inequality, the parties must be required to
share their factual information.
133. See infra notes 232-67 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 208-18 and accompanying text. There are non-judicial case managers
as well. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
135. See e.g., M. BEYER & R. URBiNA, AN EMERGING JuDicIAL ROLE IN FAMILY COURT
(1986); Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 Tm,. L. REv.
1, 30 (1987); Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Trial
Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. Rv. 863, 883-84 (1987); Sander, Alternative
Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. Rv. 1, 13 (1985).
136. See, e.g., S. LANDsMA, supra note 2, at 52-53; Friedman & Anderson, Divorce
Mediation's Strengths, 3 CALIF. LAw. 36 (1983); Hyman, supra note 135, at 864; Riskin,
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 29, 33 (1982); Sander, supra note 135, at 13-14.
This rationale could easily apply to all kinds of litigation. A procedure for resolving disputes
of any kind may work better if it is designed to diminish rather than encourage contentious
behavior. Some commentators worry that non-contentious procedure may encourage too
much compromise: People will abandon their rights too early. See Brunet, supra note 135,
at 38; Edwards, Alternate Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv.
668, 677 (1985); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984). I am not
convinced of this, but even if it is a potential problem, we are certainly creative enough to
devise ways of protecting against it. Furthermore, a contentious procedure may well en-
courage people to press unsubstantiated claims beyond all reason. See generally J. LIEBER-
MAN, THE LiriGious SocmrTr (1981).
137. Discovery is governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1970 & Supp. 1988); Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940 (1961) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
138. Discovery is limited to facts in the possession of one's opponent. In general, it
cannot be used to learn the other side's legal theories or litigation strategy. See FED. R.
CIrv. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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Although pretrial discovery has origins in Roman and canon law,"19 its
development in Anglo-American law has been relatively recent. 140 Use of
discovery broadened beyond its moorings in equity procedure in England
during the nineteenth century, 14' but its early development in the United
States was largely confined to individual states.1 42 With the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, discovery became an essential
part of federal procedure. Since that time, it has been the subject of
considerable discussion and debate. 43
Discovery is a non-adversarial element in adjudication. It works some
changes in both party control and judicial passivity, but the scope of those
changes is open to some debate. On the one hand, discovery was designed
to operate independently of the judge to the extent possible. With rare
exceptions, no judicial order is required to conduct discovery.144 The parties
involve the judge only when they have a dispute over discovery. Thus, the
traditional roles of the parties and the judge are preserved. On the other
hand, the parties are required, under threat of sanctions that could include
loss of the case or contempt, to turn over facts in their possession to their
opponent in the litigation.145 The party, then, loses some control over
what he does with the information he has. Most litigants engage in
considerable negotiation over discovery disputes in hopes of avoiding a
trip before the judge; this negotiation can restore some of that lost control.
139. See Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Pro-
cedure, 32 ILL. L. Rav. 261, 261-76 (1937).
140. See id. at 437-52; Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36
MICH. L. REv. 215, 219-26 (1937).
141. See Millar, supra note 139, at 442-46; Sunderland, supra note 140, at 219-21.
142. See 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 493-99 (1959); Developments in the Law, supra
note 137, at 950; Millar, supra note 139 at 446-52.
143. See generally W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DIScoVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968);
Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in
the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978); Brazil, supra note 70; Developments in
the Law, supra note 137; Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REv. 205 (1942); Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery,
28 F.R.D. I11 (1962); Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure (pts.
I-I), 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1179, 1436 (1938); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial
Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 480 (1958); Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an
Adversary System, 63 MInN. L. REv. 1055 (1979); Speck, The Use of Discovery in United
States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132 (1951); Sunderland, supra note 140; Note, The
Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L.
REv. 1033 (1978) [herinafter Note, Deterence Orientation].
144. The principle exception is for physical and mental examinations. See FED. R. Crv.
P. 35. Judicial orders are also required for follow-up examinations of testifying expert
witnesses. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
145. Parties are not normally required to turn over documents prepared by that party or
his representatives. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). That "work product" rule is designed to
prevent parties from obtaining material that reveals litigation strategy or other "mental
impressions" of lawyers and other professionals. However, it is not designed to prevent a
party from revealing facts in his possession.
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Even so, their knowledge that the judge could force them to disgorge
information affects their strategic decisions, including settlement decisions.
The seriousness of the interference with party control is also somewhat
mitigated by the use of discovery as an adversarial weapon. Many lawyers
use discovery offensively, as a tool to harass or delay. 46 Because judges
are not routinely involved in discovery, and because the parties are
generally reluctant to take even discovery disputes to the judge, the parties
can sometimes use discovery tools with considerable contentious effect. 47
Such use of discovery is more likely to occur in major litigation where
the stakes are high and money can be spent on discovery. 4 But such use
of discovery was not intended; it occurs because discovery is anomalous
in an adversary system. It is, in fact, a non-adversarial element in adju-
dication, which might be expected to have the mixed results it has had.
Discovery exists because the adversary system does not work perfectly.
It is an attempt to overcome the effects of one of the inequalities-the
inequality of information-that undermines adversarial fact-finding. It is
an admission that one of the assumptions of adversarial adjudication-
the assumption of equality-cannot be supported. The assumption' of
equality became part of the adversary system some time after it was
recognized that magic could not determine victors. If God does not decide
who wins, the system must do so; but the system can do so only if the
parties are equal-in resources, analytical skill, creativity, advocacy skill,
and information. In other words, the adversary system itself is the magic
that replaces God's intervention. Discovery is a subtle admission that the
system does not do what it is intended to do.
In addition to equalizing the parties (in theory, at least), discovery is
consistent with the elements of fair adjudication, and may enhance some
of them. While judges who become involved in discovery disputes are
certainly less passive than the traditional adversary model requires, their
impartiality should not be affected. Judges in continental Europe, who
146. The subject of "discovery abuse" is a recurrent theme in the debate. The problem
is that discovery, which is an essentially cooperative device, has been grafted onto a non-
cooperative system; the result is predictable. Instead of being used to open up the fact files
of all the parties, as was intended, discovery has come to be another weapon in the
adversarial arsenal. It is sometimes used to harass opponents or to delay the litigation.
Problems of discovery abuse, however, are most prominent in complex litigation, where the
parties can afford to use discovery tactics and where discovery strategizing is more likely to
pay off. See generally W. GLASER, supra note 143; Brazil, supra note 70; Brunet, supra
note 135 at 34; Speck, supra note 143; Developments in the Law, supra note 137; Note,
Deterrence Orientation, supra note 143; Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules:
Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 356-60 (1982).
147. See, e.g., W. GLASER, supra note 143, at 36, 130, 197; Brazil, supra note 70, at
1314-15; Speck, supra note 143, at 1149-50; Developments in the Law, supra note 137, at
942; Note, Deterrence Orientation, supra note 143, at 1033-35.
148. See, e.g., W. GLASER, supra note 143, at 191-97.
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are much more active than is an American judge who decides a discovery
dispute, are not considered to lose their impartiality because of their active
role. 149 Furthermore, while judges who decide discovery disputes sometimes
see evidence that is inadmissible at trial, 150 our system has always assumed
that judges are capable of ignoring inadmissible evidence.' 5 ' In any event,
judicial intervention is still the exception rather than the rule, and discovery
disputes are often decided by magistrates rather than judges, thus pre-
serving the judge's pristine purity for the trial. 5 2
Discovery may, moreover, have a significant impact on rational deci-
sionmaking. If the parties know the information that is available to both
sides, they can better predict the outcome.'53 That knowledge, in turn,
prepares them better for presenting factual and legal argument to the trial
judge. At the same time, the parties still have an undiminished voice in
the proceedings. They are free to make their own arguments based on the
information that is available-indeed, based on fuller information than
there would be without discovery. That voice should help preserve their
individual dignity, though some might argue that dignity is undermined
by the requirement that litigants disgorge information on the threat of
149. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 857.
150. Such judges sometimes must inspect documents in camera, for example, to determine
the extent of their discoverability. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S.
394, 405 (1976); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 1984); Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); United States v. Friedman, 636 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). And discoverability is not necessarily coterminous with admissibility. See, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b); Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1963); Bell v. Swift & Co., 283
F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1960).
151. Errors in admitting evidence are generally considered harmless within the meaning
of FED. R. Civ. P. 61 when the judge is the fact-finder, unless it can be proven that the
judge relied on the inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Goodman v. Highlands Ins. Co., 607
F.2d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1979); Multi-Medical Convalescent & Nursing Center of Towson v.
N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 974, 977-78 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Builders Steel
Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950); Granin Grain & Seed Co. v.
United States, 170 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1948). Such errors are more likely to be grounds
for reversal when the jury is the fact-finder. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co.,
815 F.2d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally Jurors Unlikely to Follow Judge's Order
to Disregard Testimony, Study Shows, Cmi. DAILY L. BuLL., March 28, 1988, at 1.
152. See 28 U.S.C. 636(b) (1982) (allowing district judges to assign discovery proceedings
to a magistrate). See generally Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Part I: The English
Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070 (1975); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Part II: The
American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1297 (1975); Note, The Expanding Influence of the
Federal Magistrate, 14 J. MAgslLL L. REv. 465 (1981). The statute governing magistrates
was declared constitutional in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), reh'g denied,
448 U.S. 916 (1980). See generally Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The
Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 CoLuM. L. Rnv.
560 (1980).
153. Predictability is never perfect, of course. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 49.
But it is virtually impossible if neither side knows what the other side is likely to present
at trial.
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contempt. A more persuasive argument, however, is that the dignity that
is achieved by a fair "fight" on full information outweighs any compulsion
that exists in the system. On balance, the system is more fair with discovery
than without it. Discovery, then, is a non-adversarial element in American
adjudication that enhances the fairness of the process.
2. Class Actions
a. History and Rationale
The class action originated in the English equitable procedure, the Bill
of Peace.154 Three requirements had to be met for suits to be brought
under the Bill of Peace: (1) there had to be too many class members for
the legal device of joinder to be practicable; (2) the members had to be
bound by common interests; and (3) the named parties had to adequately
represent the other class members. 55 Cases brought under the Bill of Peace
generally involved customary groups such as manors and parishes, and
related to claims regarding land or status. 56 Under English equity practice,
questions of the adequacy of a named party's representation or the effect
of a judgment on unnamed parties never arose. The named party had to
seek consent from all unnamed parties, so that they did, in fact, personally
choose their representative in the litigation. 57 Furthermore, the class being
represented was, as a customary group, easily delimited, so it was easy to
determine who was abound. 58 The Bill of Peace, then, was a device of
limited applicability, chiefly beneficial as a means of controlling the docket.
The principles underlying the Bill of Peace were incorporated into the
early equity rules in the United States. In the United States, however,
where classes were defined by common interests not necessarily associated
with any pre-existing customary group, 5 9 there was controversy over
whether such a judgment could be binding on persons not before the
court. 60 The original class action rule, Federal Equity Rule 48, stated
explicitly that such persons were not bound.'6 ' In 1912, that provision was
154. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCDURE 1751, at 7-8
(2d ed. 1986). See generally Edmunds, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 J.
MARSHALL L. Rav. 291, 298 (1938).
155. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 154, § 1751, at 7-8.
156. See, e.g., How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 1 Vern. 23, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch. 1681).
See generally Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuITY 200-01 (1950); Yeazell, Group Litigation
and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 CoLuI,. L. Rv. 866 (1977).
157. See Yeazell, supra note 156, at 878.
158. See id. at 876-78.
159. See id. at 876-77.
160. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 154, § 1751, at 12-14.
161. See id. at 12-13.
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dropped, creating confusion that was further aggravated by apparently
conflicting Supreme Court decisions regarding the binding effect of judg-
ments under the new rule. 62
When law and equity were merged in 1938, the class action became part
of the new federal rules, but the new concept of class actions was different
from the one that informed the equity rules. Three categories of class
actions were set up, based on the nature of the right involved. The first
two, commonly referred to as "true" and "hybrid" class actions, per-
mitted suits similar to those brought under the Bill of Peace. 63 True class
actions concerned joint or common interests in such areas as tort or
contract. 64 Hybrid class actions had to do with several interests in prop-
erty-nuisance was the paradigm. 65 The third category, termed "spuri-
ous," covered several interests that were bound only by a common question
of law or fact. 166 True and hybrid class actions were considered binding
on all members of the class, but "spurious" class actions bound only
those class members who explicitly joined in the class action. 167 This limit
on the binding effect of spurious class actions lessened the impact of an
otherwise significant change, permitting class members to choose to be
bound if victory were assured, but not if defeat seemed likely.
In 1966, the class action rule was overhauled: the three categories were
restructured; the intervention privilege for common question class actions
was changed to an "opt-out" privilege, strengthening the binding effect
of judgments; and judicial oversight of the class action litigation was
strengthened and systematized. 68 The three categories are now defined
functionally. The first permits class actions to be maintained when indi-
vidual actions would be so related as to involve substantially the same
issues, creating a risk of inconsistent adjudication. The second covers
cases where the relief sought is an injunction generally applicable to the
class. The third category, which is similar to the spurious class actions of
the original rule, was thought by some to have been broadened considerably
162. Compare Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) with Christopher
v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938). See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally 7A C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 154, § 1751, at 13-14.
163. Compare 7A C. WRu-GT & A. MILER, supra note 154, § 1752, at 16 with Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 156, at 201. As noted above, one difference is that suits under the Bill of Peace
involved groups that had an independent existence. See Yeazell, supra note 156, at 876-77.
The original federal class action rule bound otherwise unrelated people who had a common
interest in the dispute.
164. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MI.LER, supra note 154, § 1752, at 16.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendments; Z. CHAnE,
supra note 156, at 252-53; Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised
by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 574-75 (1937).
168. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; id. advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendments.
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in scope when the opt-in privilege was changed to an opt-out privilege.' 69
While it has been argued that the rise in the incidence of class actions is
attributable to the 1966 revision of the rule,170 Professor Arthur Miller
has argued that the increase is due to a confluence of societal changes,
so that even the old equity rules would have been made to accommodate
the growing need for class actions.' 7'
b. Non-Adversarial Aspects of the Class Action
The position of unnamed class members presents the most obvious
compromise of adversarial principles. Unnamed class members have no
choice in the initiation of a suit that can affect them profoundly. Class
actions brought under either Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2)-the first two
categories of class actions-do not even require notice to the individual
class members that the suit has been initiated, though it is within the
judge's discretionary power to order it. 172 While notice is required in all
three categories before settlement or dismissal of a class action, 73 it is not
clear that the unnamed class members have any substantial power once
they have received notice. Certainly, one protest against a settlement that
the judge thought was fair would not be likely to have much effect. In
any event, the first two categories of class actions could proceed normally
through the trial to a judgment binding on all unnamed class members
without any notice ever being given.
Unnamed class members have somewhat more freedom of choice in the
third category of class actions, though it is still limited. The best practicable
notice must be given them soon after the suit is begun,17 4 and they have
the opportunity to opt out of the suit. If they opt out, they of course do
not share in any damage award, but they then have the opportunity to
relitigate the issue, perhaps winning a higher judgment. 7 5 Many modern
class actions, however, are brought precisely because the individual dam-
ages are too low to make individual suit worthwhile. 176 Even if damages
169. See Miller, supra note 31, at 670.
170. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task
Force, reprinted in 74 F.R.D. 159, 194 (1976).
171. See Miller, supra note 31; see also Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1373 (1976).
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1), (2). Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2) with FED. R. Crv.
P. 23(d)(2).
173. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e). See generally Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements:
The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 IcH. L. REV. 308
(1985).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
175. If the class loses, it is unlikely that an individual would attempt a suit.




are substantial, the award is likely to be higher than in an individual suit
because of the overall savings in attorney resources.177 A final alternative-
to intervene as a named party-would give the class member more control
over the course of the litigation, but may be prohibitively expensive in
relation to the expected judgment. Thus, there is considerable incentive to
remain in the class as an unnamed member, and little to opt out.
The lack of control over initiation of the suit may be the unnamed class
member's smallest concern. In the first two categories of class actions,
and in the third when the class member chooses to remain in the class,
the unnamed class member has no effective control over the course of the
litigation. He does not choose the attorney, 78 he does not consult with
the attorney as to his wishes,179 and he has no knowledge of the devel-
opment of proofs and the legal arguments. In short, though bound by the
judgment, he has no adversarial participation in the suit. From the
perspective of the unnamed class member, then, the class action severely
compromises adversarial principles, despite the fact that it is theoretically
extending them to persons previously unable, for economic reasons, to
take advantage of them.8 0
It might be expected that the named parties, at least, have almost full
advantage of the principles of adversarial adjudication. But because the
unnamed class members are so vulnerable, they must be protected against
the potential incompetence of the persons who claim to speak for them.
Thus, a lengthy certification process must begin soon after commencement
of the suit.' A member of a class may sue as a representative of the
177. Attorneys are often paid out of the judgment or settlement in the third category of
class actions, and some fees have attracted attention for being excessive. See, e.g., Kirkham,
Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 202 (1976);
American College of Trial Lawyers, Recommendation of the Special Committee on Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20-21 (1972). But see Miller, supra note 31, at 667.
178. Indeed, often the attorney chooses the client. See Lee & Weisbrod, Public Interest
Law Activities in Education, in PUBUC INTEMST LAW, supra note 28, 313 (school finance).
179. Presumably, he could make his wishes known, but the attorney's client is the named
party, and unless there was massive rebellion in the ranks of the class, it is unlikely that
one class member would have much effect.
180. The class action also creates ethical problems for the attorney with respect to the
unnamed class members. Though he is representing them as well as the named parties, he
has no systematic way of learning their wishes. Often the class is massive, making effective
communication impossible even if the attorney wished to attempt it. Because he is out of
touch with most of the people he is representing, the attorney may make incorrect assump-
tions as to their wishes. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 505-11 (1976). Adversarial
participation is thus further diluted. See generally Levenhagen, Class Actions: Judicial
Control of Defense Communication with Absent Class Members, 59 IND. L.J. 133 (1984);
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Class Actions: Fashioning an Exception to Promote
Adequacy of Representation, 97 HAv. L. Rv. 947 (1984).
181. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1).
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class only if the class and its proposed representative meet all four
requirements of Rule 23(a):
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracti-
cable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.12
In addition, the suit must fall into one of the three categories outlined in
Rule 23(b).18 3
Of these requirements for class certification, the most important in terms
of the named party's ability to participate is adequacy of representation.
Adequacy has two prongs: Both the class representative and his attorney
must adequately represent the class. 8 4 Judicial inquiry into adequacy of
counsel could result in a determination that, for example, more experienced
counsel is needed to adequately press the claims of the class. The judge
may require that additional counsel be hired, or even, in extreme cases,
that counsel hired by the named party be replaced. This kind of supervision
can interfere with the attorney-client relationship even when both the
named party and the attorney are satisfied. Not only does this supervision
compromise the principle that a person should choose his own represen-
tative, but it also diminishes the party's ability to participate by forcing
on the party an attorney with whom he may be less comfortable and,
therefore, less forthcoming. The named party becomes almost unnecessary
as attention is focused on the class as a whole and on its attorney.
The named party also loses most of his control over termination of the
suit. Though he can choose whether to initiate the suit, his power to end
the suit is limited. The traditional power of a party over settlement is
gone, as judicial approval of any proposed settlement is required." 5
Approval is also required for dismissal of a suit, including voluntary
dismissal by the named party.8 6 This judicial power over settlement and
182. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a). Rule 23 applies to defendant class actions as well as plaintiff
class actions. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. While acknowledging that fact, this article will use the
terminology of plaintiff class actions for reasons of simplicity. For a discussion of the
special problems associated with defendant class actions, see Note, Defendant Class Actions,
91 HAgv. L. REv. 630 (1978).
183. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
184. On the effectiveness of this requirement in protecting unnamed class members, see
Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failure of Nonparty Preclusion and an
Alternative Proposal, 67 IowA L. REv. 917, 949-54 (1982); Wilton, Functional Interest
Advocacy in Modern Complex Litigation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 37 (1982).
185. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
186. See id. In fact, if the party drops out and no class member comes forward to replace
him, the judge may have no choice but to dismiss. In such a case, however, it is not clear
that the case was strongly supported in the first place. In any event, judicial power over
settlement is more intrusive than dismissal.
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dismissal-particularly settlement-may mean that a party will be required
to continue litigation that he could have terminated satisfactorily, further
interfering with his participation in the suit.
It is already clear that the adversarial principle of judicial passivity is
not honored in the class action. Indeed, if neither the class nor the named
representative has control over the litigation, a logical place to find that
power is in the judge. In addition to his power over settlement and choice
of counsel, the judge, in determining, for example, whether there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, must often conduct a full
inquiry into the nature of the evidence and arguments in the case. While
a certification decision is not a decision on the merits, this power gives
the judge considerable control over the development of the case for trial.
Indeed, the certification decision is the most important decision in a class
action. Depending on the outcome, the case often ends in settlement or
non-prosecution. The judge's control over the case, then, is almost as
complete as is the party's control under the adversarial model. Further-
more, the judge becomes so familiar with the case before trial that he
may well decide the case early in the proceedings; indeed, with the
certification decision, he is almost required to do So.'8 7 The class action
is clearly one of the most non-adversarial elements in modern American
procedure.
c. The Class Action and Fair Adjudication
The rationale given for the Bill of Peace, and carried over into all
versions of the American class action, was an efficiency rationale: The
device prevents multiplicity of suits,'88 thereby benefiting the plaintiffs,
who can pool their resources; the defendant, who can save considerable
time and money by litigating the issues only once; and the judicial system
itself, which has limited ability to handle an influx of cases. 89 Recently,
however, a substantive "fairness" rationale has been offered for the
modern American class action: The device permits claims to be brought
before the courts that otherwise would be economically infeasible. This
rationale is related to changes in substantive law that widen the reach of
communitarian public law ideals' 90 and provide for vindication of those
187. Presumably a different judge, or a magistrate, could conduct pretrial procedures in
class actions, but that would entail some efficiency losses over current procedures.
188. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 156, at 200-01.
189. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 171, at 1353-72; see also
Scott, supra note 27, at 940.
190. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. Rav.
1281, 1284 (1976); Miller, supra note 31, at 669-76. See generally PuBLIC INTEREST LAW,
supra note 28.
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ideals through private causes of action. 91 Very often the individual losses
from violations of laws that confer broad new rights on people are too
small to support a lawsuit, but when combined with other individuals'
losses, a suit for damages becomes supportable. While the class action
does not, in theory, add to the schedule of individual substantive rights,
it does facilitate enforcement of those rights that do exist. The fairness
rationale for the class action, then, might be thought to be that it is
appropriate to broaden the operation of the adversary system, so that its
benefits are available to communities of interests and not just autonomous
individual interests. 92 The fairness rationale for class actions does not
relate to an individual lawsuit or the relationships of the parties, but
rather to the operation of the system as a whole. In this way it differs
from the fairness rationale for discovery.
The strengths of the class action, in terms of the elements of fair
adjudication, are that it provides for a more rational decision by enabling
the full scope of a controversy to be presented to the court, and it provides
a voice for some individuals who might not otherwise have one. When a
controversy affects hundreds or even thousands of individuals, but trans-
action costs make it impossible for them to join together to prosecute
their case, the court may not be fully cognizant of the number of people
affected. And if those people do not have a sufficient stake to support
an individual lawsuit, as is often the case, 193 they may be left without a
voice at all unless the class action remedy is available. In that way, their
individual dignity in being able to vindicate their rights is also enhanced.
Finally, judicial impartiality need not be affected any more than it is in
other kinds of litigation in which the judge is involved early in the
proceedings.
The class action, a thoroughly non-adversarial device, seems nevertheless
to be a fair procedure. The only potential concern is that the judge will
become so involved in the merits of the case on the certification decision
that his impartiality will be affected. Certification, however, often is the
thrust of a class action. The class action is the kind of case that fulfills
the behavior modification goal described above. If the goal is behavior
modification, it may be appropriate that the major decision in class action
191. Examples of these include antitrust, securities, and discrimination. See Chayes, supra
note 190, at 1284. A private cause of action for a public law violation is a clear example
of combining individualist behavior of self-reliance with communitarian values such as the
public interest.
192. This was also part of the rationale behind legal programs serving the poor. See
Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW, supra note 28, at 28-29.
193. See PUBLIC INTERE sT LAW, supra note 28, at 12-13.
19891
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
litigation is the certification decision. 194 The importance of the certification
decision may also make it appropriate that the judge is involved heavily
in the decision at this early stage.
3. Specialized Courts
Specialized courts might also be seen as a non-adversarial development
in adjudication. Judges in specialized courts acquire expertise that may-
indeed, is intended to-influence their decisions to some extent. A judge
with some independent knowledge of the legal principles and policies
surrounding the controversy may be less subject to influence through
briefing and argument. In other words, the parties have somewhat less
control in the sense that their careful packaging of the case may be
transparent to an expert. This potential loss of control is one reason why
specialized courts have engendered so much opposition over many dec-
ades. 19 5 To some extent, attorneys have come to expect a decisionmaker-
whether judge or jury-who can be persuaded. Indeed, many hope to
overcome a weak case through persuasive skills. That may be harder to
do when the judge is an expert. 19 6
There are many specialized courts in this country, at both the state and
the federal levels. 197 Indeed, specialized courts have existed for most of
194. Most of the resources in class action litigation are expended in the certification
phase. Cases often settle after the certification decision. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1987); Coker, "Not Dead But Only Sleeping". The Rejection of the
Death Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied Certification, 59 B.U.L.
Rav. 257 (1979); see also In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1975);
Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2nd Cir. 1974); Kamp, Civil Procedure in
the Class Action Mode, 19 WAKE FoREST L. Rv. 401 (1983).
195. See, e.g., Rifkind, A Specialized Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a
Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951); Sward & Page, The Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act: A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 Am. U.L. Rav. 385, 395-400 (1984). See generally
Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 745 (1981).
196. Of course, one always runs the risk that the judge who hears a case may be an
expert in the area of law at issue, but in a specialized court, it is a virtual certainty.
197. State-level specialized courts include probate courts and family courts. At the federal
level, the most prominent specialized court is probably the bankruptcy court, though it has
many elements of generalized courts as well; in particular, while the structure of the court's
decision is governed by the Bankruptcy Code, it has authority over a wide range of matters
simply because bankruptcy affects so many non-bankruptcy matters, including contracts and
security interests, to name just two. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. IV 1987) (core proceedings).
Other specialized trial-level federal courts include the United States Claims Court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7448-7502 (1982 & Supp. II
1984), and the Court of International Trade, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). On
the appellate level, the only permanent specialized federal court is the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (jurisdiction
of Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). See generally Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform:
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982-and Beyond, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 543 (1983);
Sward & Page, supra note 195.
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this century.198 Most of these courts are relatively low-level courts, with
at least one and usually two levels of review available from their deci-
sions.' 99 Several years ago, Congress created the first permanent specialized
appellate level federal court when it set up the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2°° An impetus for creating the Federal
Circuit was the lack of uniformity in patent law, with different circuits
developing different, and often inconsistent, legal principles. Now all
patent appeals go to the Federal Circuit, so the problem of uniformity
should resolve itself.
Specialized courts reflect an increasing specialization within society as a
whole. People who have developed expertise in a given area are seen as
more qualified to resolve differences in those areas. If decisionmakers are
experts themselves, they are better able to evaluate the technical arguments
presented to them in complex subjects. But this necessarily means that the
decisionmakers will, to some extent, bring their expertise to bear on their
decision. There is less opportunity for the advocates to influence them,
with the result that parties lose some control. And because the judge is
an expert, he is less passive than he is in matters where he does not have
expertise; he is more likely to want to explore technical matters that the
parties have tried to avoid.
A judge who thoroughly understands a complex field, such as bank-
ruptcy or patents, should be better able to evaluate the arguments that
are presented to him. In that sense, the proceedings should be more
rational; attorneys are adept at evaluating their arguments and will know
that weak arguments should fare especially poorly in a specialized court.
In theory, predictability is enhanced. Some may argue that there is more
chance of a biased judge in specialized courts, as he will bring his own
knowledge, expertise and predilections to the matter. This, however, is
true in all courts-one takes the judge as he is, with all his background. 20 1
Any loss of impartiality from this cause should be marginal, and is greatly
outweighed by the gains in rationality. Specialized courts should have little
198. One of the first was the short-lived Commerce Court. See Mann-Elkins Act of June
18, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, repealed by Act of October 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208,
219. See generally F. FRUNKFURTER & J. LANDis, THE Busnss oF THE SuPREM E CouRT
146-76 (1927); Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness,
8 AM. J. LEGIS. HIsT. 238 (1964).
199. See supra note 197. For example, cases in the Court of International Trade are
appealed to the Federal Circuit, with discretionary review in the United States Supreme
Court. The bankruptcy courts are considered adjuncts to the district courts, and their
decisions are reviewable at all three federal levels. See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 & Supp. II
1984).
200. See supra note 197.
201. Attorneys generally know the judge's background and biases in any court. Thus, it
is possible both to account for the judge's background and biases in making predictions,
and to couch one's argument in terms more likely to play to those biases.
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or no impact on the voice that parties have, as they are still expected to
investigate and present their own cases. For similar reasons, there should
be little or no impact on the individual dignity of the parties. In short,
specialized courts have non-adversarial elements, but they are still fair.
4. Masters and Court-Appointed Experts
A fourth non-adversarial element that exists under the federal rules is
the use of masters and court-appointed experts. 20 2 These people are ap-
pointed by the court and are able to help sort out the complexities of the
issues. 201 Masters existed in equity procedure prior to the promulgation of
the federal rules, but they are most useful in complex litigation, which is
much more common today. 20 4 Indeed, the increasing complexity of liti-
gation, in terms of subject matter and number of parties, may be an
important reason for the increasing use of such persons. 20 1 The Manual
for Complex Litigation recommends fairly liberal use of such aides.
206
Masters and court-appointed experts are non-adversarial for much the
same reason that specialized courts are non-adversarial. Although they are
not decisionmakers, unlike the expert judges in specialized courts, they
may carry considerable weight with the judge. A judge who relies on a
master or court-appointed expert may view that person as less biased than
expert witnesses called by the parties. The parties, after all, are looking
for expertise that supports them; the judge is simply looking for the right
answer. The master, functioning as an arm of the court, is anything but
202. See FED. R. Crv. P. 53 (masters); FED. R. EviD. 706 (court-appointed experts). See
generally MANUAL FOR COmPLEX LITIGATION § 21.51 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter MANUAL].
203. See, e.g., Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public
Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265; Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed
Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313 (1981);
Little, Court-Appointed Special Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City of
Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission, 8 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 435 (1984). Debate
over court-appointed experts is taking place in other countries that use adversarial adjudi-
cation as well. See Freckelton, Court Experts, Assessors and the Public Interest, 8 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCH. 161 (1986) (Australia).
204. See generally MANUAL, supra note 202, at 97-98, 100-02; Brazil, Special Masters in
Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.
394 (1986); Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 452
(1958); Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement,
53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424 (1986); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I: The English
Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1070 (1975); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part 1.: The
American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1297 (1975).
205. See, e.g., W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RICE, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 6-12 (1983).
206. See MANUAL, supra note 202, at 98-102. Masters are sometimes used to assist in
discovery management though there is some dispute over the propriety of that use. See W.
BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RICE, supra note 205, at 315-88; Lord, Discovery Abuse: Appointing
Special Masters, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 63 (1986).
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passive in searching out the right answer. In addition, masters and court-
appointed experts undermine party control. Masters may have considerable
freedom to explore the issues related to their expertise. 207 It may be more
difficult for the parties to hide or distort evidence, or to package the
evidence to best suit their aims.
While masters and court-appointed experts alter both principal features
of adversarial adjudication, it would be hard to argue that their use is
unfair. The decisionmaker-the judge-remains impartial, but he seeks
more information on which to base his decision. As long as that additional
information is available to the parties, there should be neither a hidden
agenda nor a loss in predictability. Indeed, a decision based on fuller
information may be inherently more rational: It may be possible to evaluate
more of the relevant factors in coming to a decision. An unbiased view
of the issue may in itself enhance rationality. In addition, the parties still
have a substantial voice in the matter and can make arguments before
both the master and the judge. If the parties disagree with the master,
they have a full opportunity to explain to the decisionmaker why the
master's view is wrong. Their individual dignity is in no way compromised
by the use of masters and court-appointed experts.
5. Case Managers-Judicial
There is considerable recent literature on the phenomenon of "mana-
gerial judging"-the practice of judges intervening in the litigation process
early and often.20 1 Managerial judges are more willing to take control of
the case, whether it means holding regular pre-trial conferences, setting
scheduling orders and discovery orders, questioning witnesses, or perform-
ing any of a number of other things that judges did not traditionally do. 20 9
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c).
208. See, e.g., W. BPAz, SETTLiNG Crv SuITs (1985); Chayes, supra note 190; Elliott,
supra note 20; Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnick, 35 HAsTINS
L.J. 505 (1984); Harrigan, Affirmative Judicial Case Management: Viable Solution to the'
Toxic Product Litigation Crisis, 38 MN. L. Rv. 339 (1986); Resnick, Managerial Judges,
96 HAxv. L. REv. 376 (1982); Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American
Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REv. 1 (1978); Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex
Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. Cm. L. Rav. 337 (1986); Sperlich, Better Judicial
Management: The Best Remedy for Complex Cases, 65 JuDicATrua 415 (1982); Will, Merhige
& Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203 (1978). This
phenomenon is unrelated to the debate over whether judges should legislate or merely
"interpret"-whatever that last term means.
209. See, e.g., Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982) (judge as case manager);
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.) (judge as case manager), amended in part, vacated
in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1982); Schwartz, The Other
Things That Courts Do, 28 UCLA L. Rav. 438 (1981). One area of considerable dispute is
the judge's role in encouraging settlement. See, e.g., W. BzaM, supra note 208; Landers,




Such activism is certainly at odds with the traditional notion of the passive
judge, sitting back and listening to the parties and then rendering a
decision. A judge who interrupts to ask questions may well influence the
course of the trial, and in a way not anticipated by either of the parties. 21 0
The parties' careful packaging may be disrupted, and they may be forced
to respond to points that they thought were not at issue. Thus, in addition
to altering the traditional role of the judge, this kind of activism also
removes some party control.
Judicial case management brings the American system closer to the
inquisitorial system of Continental Europe than any of the other non-
adversarial elements discussed here. Therefore, in considering whether
managerial judging is fair, one must consider whether the Continental
European system is fair. We have already seen, however, that inquisitorial
adjudication can be fair, especially as it exists today in Europe.2 1 ' To
reiterate, some would argue that such active participation in the case
makes it difficult for a judge to remain impartial throughout the litigation
process: The judge is likely to decide the case too early.212 But European
systems have devices designed to help ensure the continued impartiality of
the judge. 21 3 If there is a potential problem with impartiality, the American
system may need to adopt some of those protective devices. Similarly,
rules-both substantive and procedural-continue to exist, and contribute
to the rationality of both systems. A judge who takes an active role may
require the parties to adjust more to unexpected developments, but that
means only that predictions must be hedged and adjusted to meet new
conditions. 2 4 Even in Continental Europe, the parties continue to have a
voice in the conduct of the investigation and the trial. 2 5 They are respected
as individuals, but their personal bias is recognized and countered. Thus,
proponents of the inquisitorial system argue that that system is more
rational because full information is more likely to be available to the
judge, and without the potentially distorting packaging that adversarial
parties and their attorneys try to present. 21 6
It is not clear, however, that judicial management in the United States
is yet like the Continental European system. While American judges have
become managers, they have not become agents for the investigation and
presentation of evidence. Thus, the incursion on party control is not yet
210. Some commentators favor such active participation by the judge as protection for
the litigants. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 93.
211. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
212. See Fuller, supra note 43.
213. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
214. Attorneys hedge their predictions in the existing adversary system as well. See J.
FRANK, supra note 3, at 26.
215. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2, at 826-29.
216. Id. at 823.
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as great in the United States as it is in continental Europe. While the
parties may be forced to adhere to timetables that they would not otherwise
have chosen, they are still responsible for the packaging. Opponents of
managerial judging seem to fear that judges will take more control over
substantive aspects of litigation, particularly by pressuring the parties to
settle.21 7 Whether this fear is justified is doubtful.21 In any event, the
experience of continental Europe establishes that an adjudicatory system
can withstand much more judicial management than the American system
has and still be fair. But it also suggests that the system itself may need
additional procedures to help ensure that fairness.
6. Non-Judicial Case Managers
Judges do not necessarily enter into case management themselves. There
are provisions in the rules for non-judicial case managers. Masters, for
example, might be used for this purpose, especially in complex litigation
where it makes sense to have someone devote his attention to manage-
ment.219 In the bankruptcy courts, the United States Trustee is a case
manager to some degree, as are trustees appointed in individual cases. 220
These non-judicial case managers are non-adversarial elements in adjudi-
cation in the same way that managerial judges are: They remove some
party control. They do not, however, necessarily undermine the traditional
role of the judge as a passive receptor of information on which to make
a decision. Where non-judicial case managers are used, the judge can still
retain his traditional role. Indeed, to the extent that discovery and other
pre-trial matters are problems of case management, magistrates can play
217. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 20, at 308; Resnick, supra note 208, at 379.
218. See Flanders, supra note 208, at 510-14.
219. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c); MANuAL, supra note 202, at 12. See generally Brazil,
supra note 204.
220. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-89 (Supp. IV 1987). United States Trustees were initially part
of a pilot program in several states. See 11 U.S.C. ch. 15 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No.
99-554, Tit. II, § 231, 100 Stat. 3097, 3103 (1986). When Congress enacted the new
Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it attempted to enhance the status of bankruptcy judges, though
they were Article I judges rather than Article III. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-51 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)). Their status was enhanced, in theory, by making them more like the
traditional adversarial judge, passive and essentially ignorant until it is time to hear a case
and render the decision. The problem is that, at least in complex reorganizations, bankruptcy
is a long process of negotiation, and some outsider was usually necessary to help oversee
the process. To some extent, that role was to fall to the United States Trustee. See generally
ExEcuTiv OFFCE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF
TnE U.S. TRUSTEE PELOT PROGRAM FOR BMAKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION (1983). The U.S.
Trustee program was made permanent in 1986. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, Tit. I, subt. B,




an important role in such management without involving the judge at
all. 22' Thus, non-judicial case managers may be less of an intrusion on
traditional adversarial adjudication than is an activist judge. 222
Non-judicial case managers may be a better solution to problems of
management than are managerial judges. There is less danger of a judge
losing his impartiality because of too-early involvement in the case, and
the parties' voice is undiminished even if it is more controlled. To the
extent that case management by a disinterested person aids in the collection
and organization of relevant information, the system may also become
more rational. Finally, some might argue that individual dignity is dimin-
ished by having someone control the parties' pre-trial preparation and
activities. The alternative of chaotic pre-trial procedures, however, must
be equally damaging to individual dignity. 223
7. Alternative Dispute Resolution
"Alternative dispute resolution" is a term that encompasses a number
of non-adversarial dispute resolution devices, such as mediation, arbitra-
tion, "mini-trials," and negotiation. 224 Many of these devices have been
221. Magistrates are often used to resolve discovery disputes. See FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a)
(nondispositive matters); see also Resnick, supra note 208, at 436 n.237; Smalkin, The Role
of United States Magistrates, 7 LITIGATION 11 (Spring 1981). See generally McCabe, The
Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 343 (1979); Comment, The Expanding
Influence of the Federal Magistrate, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 465 (1981). The U.S.
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982), was held to be constitutional in United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). See generally Comment, The Boundaries of Article III:
Delegation of Final Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 1032
(1985).
222. To the extent that such non-judicial managers are perceived as having less authority
than judges, however, there may still be some attempt to involve the judge, particularly by
the party that has lost a pre-trial skirmish. See FED. R. Crv. P. 73(d), 74, 75.
223. Whoever does it, there seems to be some need for non-party management. See Brazil,
Improving Judicial Controls Over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules
for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 873; Symposium on
Litigation Management, 53 U. Cm. L. Rav. 305 (1986); Nagel, Neef & Munshaw, Bringing
Management Science to the Courts to Reduce Delay, 62 JUDICATURE 128 (1970); Schwarzer,
Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDIcATURE 400 (1978). This is
especially true in complex litigation. See W. BPAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RicE, supra note
205; MANUAL, supra note 202.
224. See, e.g., CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES
AND LAWYERS (1987); S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DisPUTE REsOLUTION (1985).
Mediation is a device whereby a neutral third party helps the parties negotiate a settlement.
In arbitration, the parties select an arbitrator, or more commonly a panel of arbitrators,
and agree to abide by the arbitrators' decision. In mini-trials, the parties go through pre-
trial preparation, then present their cases to each other or to a neutral third party. They
are then better prepared for negotiation, particularly when the neutral third party gives his
informal view of the case. See Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, 9 LITGATION 12 (1982);
Parker and Radoff, The Mini-Hearing: An Alternative to Protracted Litigation of Factually
Complex Disputes, 38 Bus. LAW. 35 (1982). Negotiation needs no definition, but it is
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part of the dispute resolution universe for some time, but they have been
getting considerable attention lately225 and are being systematically studied
in law schools for the first time. 226 Indeed, they are explicitly favored in
some applications because they get away from the adversarial tension that
exists in our system of adjudication. 227 They are essentially cooperative,
rather than contentious, devices for dispute resolution.
To some extent it makes little sense to examine these means of dispute
resolution in terms of the elements of adversarial adjudication because
they are not elements of an adjudicatory procedure, but rather are alter-
natives to that procedure. But it is instructive to consider, at least, the
issue of party control because the parties have considerably more control
over the outcomes in all of the methods of alternative dispute resolution
than they do in adversarial adjudication. In mediation, negotiation, and
mini-trials, for example, they have ultimate control over the decision
because it is essentially a negotiated decision to which they must agree,
freely, in order for it to have any effect. 22H Arbitration, which is more
like adversarial adjudication than the other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, normally requires the advance consent of the parties, usually
by contract.229 Arbitration also normally gives each party the opportunity
receiving more attention in the literature lately, including some literature on the principles
of negotiation. See, e.g., R. FIsHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981). See generally J. AUJERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983)
(alternative dispute resolution as part of a quest for community).
225. Interest in alternative dispute resolution began to grow in the late 1960's. See S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 224, at 3.
226. By 1985, at least 45 law schools offered courses in alternative dispute resolution.
See, e.g., Green, A Comprehensive Approach to the Theory and Practice of Dispute
Resolution, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245 (1984); Sander, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
Law School Curriculum: Opportunities and Obstacles, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229 (1984);
Schrag, Terry White: A Two-Front Negotiation Exercise, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 729 (1986).
227. See S. LANDsMAN, supra note 2, at 52 (family law); D. McGLLIs, CONSUMER DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: A SURVEY OF PROGRAMS (National Institute for Dispute Resolution 1987)
(consumer law); see also R. COtLSON, How TO STAY OUT OF COURT 13-28 (1984); Cooke,
Mediation: A Boon or a Bust?, in A.B.A. SPECIAL COM TTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PAPERS (Series 2 1983).
228. See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PAPERS
(Series 3 1984); S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 225; Green, supra note
224. The flexibility that stems from allowing the parties to select the ground rules is one of
the primary reasons why they choose ADR. "The parties can agree to change virtually
anything that will occur, for it is their arbitration and the arbitrator's authority is drawn
from them." RESOLvING DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION 14 (BNA Special Report 1985)
(emphasis in original).
229. See, e.g., Neff, Arbitration Provisions in Mining Agreements, in P. DUTFORD,
SHORTCOMINGS OF LITIGATION JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS 21-22 (1984). In most jurisdictions,
arbitration is final and the parties cannot later litigate the issues in court. See, e.g., Prima
Paint Corp. v. Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1967); Galt v. Flood & Libbey-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967).
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to select one of the arbitrators. 2 0 The parties have no opportunity to
select the judge who will hear their case in ordinary litigation. 23'
Alternative dispute resolution represents a strong movement away from
traditional adversarial adjudication. As such, it merits our careful consid-
eration. It is yet another indication that the traditional adversary system
of adjudication, to which we render so much obeisance, is not a completely
satisfactory method of resolving disputes. Furthermore, the fact that
parties seem to have more control over the resolution of their disputes
under these alternative methods suggests that principles of party partici-
pation and individual dignity-so extolled by apologists for adversarial
advocacy-may be better served by more cooperative methods of dispute
resolution.
C. Modern Complex Litigation
The adversary system is most compromised in complex litigation. 2 2 It
remains to define complex litigation and to analyze whether the modern
non-adversarial innovations are most in evidence in complex litigation.
This section describes three kinds of complex litigation: complex factual
issues, multi-party litigation, and legally complex litigation. The uses of
non-adversarial mechanisms are then described with respect to each of
them.
1. Complex Factual Material
Historical equity procedure allowed for a bill in equity for an ac-
counting. 233 This device allowed a decisionmaker to get help in sorting out
complicated bookkeeping and to trace funds. 2 4 Today, under the federal
rules, accounting is not a particularly difficult matter to litigate.23s But
230. See RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION, supra note 228, at 13; Roth, Choosing
an Arbitration Panel, in P. DUFFORD, SHORTCOMINGS OF LITIGATION JUDICIAL DETERMINA-
TIONS 26 (1984); American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules 13, 14.
231. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT., S.D.N.Y. R. 1 (Individual Assignment System); U.S. DIST.
CT., E.D.N.Y. R. 50.2(b) (random) (judge not known before assignment); U.S. DIST. CT.,
E.D. PA. R. 3(b)(1) (same); U.S. DIST. CT., S.D. CAL. R. 205-1 (same). Some courts do
not normally assign cases to a particular judge at all. See, e.g., SUPER. Cr. R. Civ. P. 40-
I, D.C. CT. RULES ANN. (1988).
232. The Manual for Complex Litigation hints at this, but continues to support adversarial
adjudication. See MANUAL, supra note 202, at v, 97; see also Air Line Stewards &
Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973); Martin
Luther King, Jr. Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School District Board, 473 F.
Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Wilton, supra note 184.
233. See generally F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 341, 345 (1965).
234. The equitable procedure of accounting was designed for those cases where the
bookkeeping was too difficult for resolution in a court of law. See id.
235. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-79 (1962).
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other areas of substantive knowledge, such as complicated scientific and
technical areas, can prove extremely difficult to litigate, in large part
because the decisionmaker-whether a judge or jury-does not have the
expertise to evaluate the evidence and arguments. Litigation involving
complex subject matter requires the decisionmaker to evaluate specialized
facts about which experts in the field can legitimately disagree. Often there
is statistical data involved, such as statistical data on the incidence of
disease among persons exposed to an allegedly disease-causing chemical. 23 6
The growing awareness of problems caused by toxic wastes, including
radioactive wastes, gives rise to a good deal of complex litigation as well. 237
The issues presented by such litigation may be the subject of considerable
debate within the field. Yet adversarial adjudication requires that a deci-
sionmaker with no prior knowledge of the dispute-and probably of the
subject matter itself-decide the issue.
Several of the non-adversarial elements identified in the previous section,
including the use of court-appointed experts, 238 masters, 23 9 and specialized
courts,m are much in evidence when such complex factual issues are before
the court. Discovery is likely to be heavy and problematic in such cases. 241
The presence of many pre-trial issues may lead to more management by
236. See Van Duizend and Saks, Scientific Evidence in Litigation: Problems, Hopes,
Accommodations, and Frustrations, THE PROSECUTOR, Spring 1985, at 29. See generally
SCIENCE AND LAw: AN EssmIA ALLLA cE (W. Thomas ed. 1983); Curtis & Wilson, The
Use of Statistics and Statisticians in the Litigation Process, 20 JuRxuiCs J. 109 (1979);
Jasonoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 22
JuRIMETIuCs J. 266 (1982); Rosenberg, The Adversary Proceeding in the Year 2000, 1
PROSPECTUS 5, 12-25 (1968).
237. See Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENvTL.
L. 131 (1980); Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FoRDHA
L. Rav. 733 (1984); Fabic, Pursuing a Cause of Action in Hazardous Waste Pollution Cases,
29 BUFFALo L. REv. 533 (1980); Comment, Establishing Liability for the Damages from
Hazardous Wastes: An Alternative Route for Love Canal Plaintiffs, 31 CATT. U.L. REv.
273 (1982).
238. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1977) (school desegregation);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (same); Pennwalt Corp.
v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1226 and
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1474 (1988) (patent infringement); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976); Doe v. Dolton Elementary School
Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (risk of transmission of AIDS); Unique
Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 659 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (patent infringement).
239. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (1988) (taxability of municipal
bonds); Young v. Pierce, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987) (desegregation of housing); Ruiz v.
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, amended in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d
266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
240. Tax, international trade, and patents all have specialized courts. See supra notes
195-201 and accompanying text.
241. As might be expected, one study found that discovery was heaviest in "big" cases-
cases where the stakes are high. See W. GLASER, supra note 143, at 189-202. Most complex
litigation is high-stakes litigation, or it would not be economically feasible to litigate it.
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the judge24 2 or to a general reference to a magistrate for resolution of
those issues.243 Increasingly, the parties are making use of alternative
dispute resolution devices, particularly the mini-trial.244
Three general principles are in evidence in the use of such non-adversarial
elements in factually complex litigation. One, evident in the growing use
of mini-trials, is the principle of party control, which is an essential
principle of adversarial adjudication. In factually complex litigation, it
appears that efforts to assemble, manage, and evaluate the issues as an
ordinary adversary proceeding so compromise party control that the only
way for the parties to keep such control is to go outside the "adversary"
system. A second principle in evidence is that of management; because
there are so many matters to consider, some effort must be made to
manage the flow of information. That supervision can diminish party
control if it is the judge or another judicial officer who does the managing.
The third principle in evidence is that of expertise. In a highly specialized
society such as ours, where people have very complex but very narrow
areas of expertise, it makes more sense for someone with some expertise
to evaluate the data and make the decision. Someone who knows nothing
about a complicated scientific issue simply cannot evaluate the arguments
effectively, even if the parties do a superb job of presenting them.
Administrative agencies have operated under principles of expertise for
some time. 24 Adversarial adjudication is much modified in agencies, even
when those agencies have adjudicative functions. 246 Indeed, there is con-
siderable case law on the scope of hearings required in agency adjudica-
tion, with adversarial hearings required in some instances247 but not
242. Several recent amendments to the federal rules give judges increased managerial
authority. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26(f).
243. See MANuAL, supra note 202, at 103.
244. See, e.g., Parker & Radoff, supra note 224.
245. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 59, at 125.
246. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
See generally Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. Rv. I11 (1972); Clagett,
Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Ad-
ministrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rv.
1267 (1975); Note, The Requirement of Formal Adjudication Under Section 5 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 12 Haav. J. oN LEGIs. 194 (1975).
247. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (tenure where school has defacto
policy of awarding tenure); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (deprivation of license and
registration); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Escalera v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (tenancy
in public housing project). See generally R. PIERCE, S. SH"IRo & P. VERIMu, supra note
59, at 335-39.
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all. 248 But in all instances, the expertise of the agency is respected. Indeed,
on review, agency expertise must be given substantial deference.249 There
is, then, an existing tension within American systems for resolving disputes.
Expertise is recognized as a legitimate basis for administrative agency
decisionmaking, but is feared as an encroachment on party participation
in judicial decisionmaking. To some extent, these different views may be
due to the different historical and constitutional bases for agency and
judicial adjudication. Agency adjudication involves some government reg-
ulation, and it is the application of that regulation that is being adjudi-
cated. In other words, it is adjudication between an individual and his
government. There is not much historical precedent for that, and there
seems to be more opportunity to adapt procedures as a result. 20 On the
other hand, judicial adjudication is historically the adjudication of private
disputes, and there is a long history of adversarial adjudication there,
with less opportunity to adapt. But much modern litigation has an impact
far beyond the individual parties to the dispute.
It is obvious that adversarial adjudication has serious shortcomings in
factually complex litigation. So many non-adversarial elements appear in
such litigation, and so many principles support the use of such non-
adversarial elements, that it is safe to say that adversarial adjudication
does not work in such litigation.
2. Multi-Party Litigation
A second form of complex litigation is litigation involving multiple
parties. Multi-party litigation was virtually unknown in common law
litigation, but it has come to fruition under the federal rules, with their
liberal joinder and class action rules. 251 Unlike the prototypical common
law case, with one party on each side arguing over a single issue, modern
litigation can involve thousands of parties, and frequently has many parties
248. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (release of untenured
teacher who had no expectancy of tenure); Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 377
U.S. 33 (1964) (adversarial hearing not required to determine if application in proper form).
See generally R. PIERCE, S. SAPrmo & P. VEm.ctm, supra note 59, at 335-39; Friendly,
supra note 246; Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary System,
11 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 48 (1976). For a theoretical discussion of adversarial advocacy
in administrative agencies, see J. HANDLER, THE CoNDMONs oF DiscREToN 121-53 (1986)."
249. See generally R. PIERCE, S. SAPimo & P. VERaui, supra note 59, at 120-27, 350-
413. For an analysis of the theory of judicial review see Shapiro & Levy, Heightened
Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DuoE L.J. 387.
250. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRo & P. VERPuEr, supra note 59, at 1-7.
251. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20, 22, 23, 24.
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on both sides. 2 2 The issues in such cases may be factually complex as
defined above, but even if they are simple, the case presents significant
management problems. For example, unless some limitations are imposed,
each plaintiff could ask each defendant the same questions in discovery,
imposing an unproductive multiple burden on the parties. 253
The class action is the most prominent non-adversarial element that can
be found in this kind of litigation. Among other things, the class action
binds class members without permitting them full participation as parties. 254
As might be expected, the other non-adversarial elements prominent in
multi-party litigation are those that aid in case management. Thus, the
judge may be much more active in such litigation, issuing scheduling
orders255 and other orders aimed at preventing harassment from excessive
discovery. Alternatively, the judge might refer matters to a magistrate for
case management.25 6
The prominence of non-party case management in multi-party litigation
suggests that the adversary system does not work well in that kind of
complex litigation. As in factually complex litigation, significant modifi-
cations are necessary-modifications that call into question the propriety
of continued reliance on adversarial adjudication in multi-party litigation.
3. Complex Legal Material
There are two kinds of legal complexity. The first is the complexity that
comes with a heavily regulated area of law, such as tax, securities, or
bankruptcy. Such areas of law usually are defined by a code (often
cumbersome) and may also have volumes of rules or regulations. 257 Often,
252. Class actions can involve thousands of class members, though most are not named
parties and have no right to participate unless they specifically enter an appearance. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See generally Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note
171. Most class actions have plaintiff classes, but there can also be defendant class actions.
See Note, supra note 182. Defendant class actions are relatively rare.
253. One party may attempt to argue that his questions are phrased differently and
therefore ask for slightly different information. If that is really the case, it may be appropriate
to allow the question to stand. But there is a significant danger in such instances of
harassment.
254. See supra notes 172-187 and accompanying text. A class member who desires to
participate as a party must seek to intervene. See FED. R. Crv. P. 24; Schroeder, supra note
184, at 950-52; Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 171, at 1482-85. See
generally Cooper, Mass and Repetitive Litigation in the Federal Courts, 38 S.C.L. REv. 489
(1987).
255. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
256. See MANuAL, supra note 202, at 11-12. The manual does not recommend routine
referral to a magistrate for case management because of efficiency losses such referral might
cause. It recommends judicial supervision in most cases. See id.; see also W. BaAzn., G.
HAZARD & P. RicE, supra note 205.
257. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. and 26 C.F.R. (17 volumes) (tax); 11 U.S.C. (bankruptcy).
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they also have their own courts to administer the complex regulations. 251
The expertise that comes with such specialized courts is critical in such
areas of law, where a crash course is likely to miss many of the important
interconnections and nuances in the law. Lawyers or judges with no
experience in those areas may be ill equipped to sort out the legal issues
and reach a decision that is rational in terms of the overall goals and
structure of the law. Unless other kinds of complexity are also present,
however, the other non-adversarial elements identified in the previous
section are not likely to play a great role.
The other kind of legal complexity is legal development, where new
legal rights and new legal doctrine are developed in the courts. In our
common law system, judges have always had considerable responsibility
for the development of legal doctrine. In the last three decades, however,
the pace and scope of that development has taken a quantum leap, working
a substantial revolution in societal institutions and relationships. 25 9 Such
litigation may require judges to consider issues that are often claimed to
be legislative rather than judicial issues. 2 0 They are argued to be legislative
because they may involve difficult considerations of social policy and
evaluations of the social effects of various options presented to the judge.
Some think that evaluation of such issues is primarily for the legislature,
which is ultimately accountable to the voters, rather than the judiciary.2 61
Litigation over the direction society should take is primarily a debate.
It is important for the decisionmaker, whether court or legislature, to
have full information and argument on the reasons for and against a
significant change in direction. But even with full information, the decision
can be difficult, and the decisionmaker needs to satisfy himself that he
understands the issues before him. Strong arguments from those who
propose the change and from those who oppose it can help to clarify the
issues. The adversary system provides a forum for that debate.
258. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441-78 (1982) (tax court); 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1982 &
Supp. II 1984) (bankruptcy courts). Even when there is no court to hear cases in a specific
complex area of law, there may be administrative agencies that do the job.
259. See Chayes, supra note 190; Fiss, supra note 23. Some significant and difficult new
doctrines that adjudication has developed over the last 30 or 40 years include implied rights
of action under the Constitution, see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); and a
revolution in equal protection ideas under the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
260. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. Professor Fiss has argued that this
kind of revolution is well suited to judicial direction. See Fiss, supra note 23.
261. The respective roles of courts and legislatures are the subject of much debate. See
supra note 23. In common law countries, however, the distinction is especially blurred, with
courts often deciding important social policy issues. See, e.g., Pound, Do We Need a
Philosophy of Law?, 5 CoLum. L. REv. 339, 346 (1905) ("[T]he common law knows
individuals only . . . . It tries questions of the highest social import as mere private




Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of the three fundamental forms
of complex litigation and the non-adversarial elements that help make
them work. It is significant that non-adversarial elements are most im-
portant in factually complex litigation and least important in legal devel-
opment litigation. But most litigation is not as pure as this analysis
suggests. Certainly most legal development will take place in the context
of factually complex or multiple-party litigation, or both. Thus, most such
litigation will involve significant non-adversarial elements because of the
factual complexity or the multi-sidedness.
FIGURE 1















Legal doctrine Specialized courts
Legal development
Public law litigation, to employ Professor Chayes's term, is often long,
expensive, and complex. Nevertheless, this kind of complex litigation,
which produces much of the social change described in the previous
subsection, is not likely to employ many of the non-adversarial elements
identified in this article unless there are also factually complex issues or
multiple parties.2 2 In other words, it is the factual complexity or the
262. Some litigation can be complex for all three of the reasons identified in this section.
For example, a case could seek damages and injunctive relief for injuries allegedly caused
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multi-sidedness that forces the use of non-adversarial elements, rather than
the problem of legal development itself. Factual complexity can be intro-
duced in such litigation, for example, when the party proposing change
attempts to prove, rather than merely speculate on, why the existing system
is unsatisfactory. Litigation over school desegregation, for example, often,
involved complicated analyses of the psychological effects of segregation.2 63
Such attempts to prove the social effects of the court's decision implicate
all of the difficulties associated with factually complex litigation, and lead
to the use of the non-adversarial devices discussed above. Similarly, many
social reform cases are brought as class actions, so the difficulties in
management associated with the class action are part of the case. 264
This analysis suggests some uncertainty over the proper approach to
social change. On the one hand, it has traditionally been considered a
legislative function to determine the direction society will take. The leg-
islative process is investigative, inquisitorial. 265 It requires active investi-
gators, and the concept of a "party" is non-existent in the legislative
process. 266 On the other hand, the value of a debate, in which the strongest
cases are made for and against the proposed change, is also unquestion-
able. 267 Debates occur in the legislative process as well, of course, but they
are the essence of adversarial adjudication. And in combination with the
non-adversarial devices that help judges and parties evaluate factually
by chemicals leaking from a toxic waste dump. Such litigation could involve complex issues
of causation (including epidemiological evidence), multiple parties on both sides of the case,
and arguments for new legal doctrine such as enterprise liability or other forms of imposing
liability when responsibility for injury is based on statistical evidence.
263. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
Judges and litigants sometimes resolve the problem of factual complexity by relying on
published studies that suggest the point urged by the proponent of change or on general
statements concerning social issues. This so-called "Brandeis brief" is not exactly proof of
facts as is normally required in litigation, but has often formed the basis for the court's
decision. On the origins of the "Brandeis brief," see L. BAKER, BRANDEIs AND FRANKFURTER:
A DUAL BxOGRAPHY 470-71 (1984); S. KoNEFsKY, THE LEoACY OF HoLmms AND BRANDEIS: A
STUDY IN THE INFLUENCE OF IDEAS 84-92 (1956); A. LIEF, BRA.NDEIS: Tn PERSONAL HIsTORY
oF A AMERICAN IDEAL 135-37 (1936); C. PEAsU, Tn Louis D. BRANDEIS STORY 153-55
(1970). Brandeis submitted his famous brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
264. Party control is often minimal in social reform litigation. Much of it is prosecuted
by public interest lawyers who are acting out of a social conscience but who conceived the
litigation themselves; the parties do not come to the lawyers, but the lawyers to the parties.
Party control loses all significance if the potential parties have no opportunity to participate
at all. Public interest lawyers give them an opportunity to participate.
265. See Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 1271, 1273-74 (1974).
266. Interested persons can express their views in the legislative process, of course. They
can communicate with legislators and, in some cases, testify before legislative committees
that are investigating issues related to pending legislation.
267. A debate formulated solely by the parties may be problematic, however, at least
when the issue is significant and goes to the structure of societal institutions. Fiss argues
that judges must take a more active role in such cases. See Fiss, supra note 23.
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complex issues and join all interested parties, it is not surprising that the
adversary system has taken on the challenge of such socially transforming
litigation. It is the debate format that makes the adversary system ideal
for such litigation, but it is the non-adversarial elements that have devel-
oped to overcome information and party-participation problems that make
it possible to use the adjudicatory system for such litigation.
IV. VALUES AND IDEOLOGY IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
The adversary system evolved in a society where common law legal
development was prominent, and where a strong legal profession and a
tradition of party control over dispute resolution prevailed. Over several
centuries, society's devotion to democratic ideals strengthened, and its
growing faith in reason helped solidify the idea that dispute resolution
could be systematized. Procedure came to be treated as a science-a
methodology that, if done right, would enable a court to arrive at the
right answer, whether the dispute was one of fact or one of law. In
England and other common law countries, these developments seemed to
point to an adversary system, which both gave effect to the new scientific
and rational view of the world and maintained the strong legal profession
and party control that had existed for centuries.
The adversary system is a highly individualistic method of dispute
resolution, leaving the formulation and presentation of the dispute entirely
to the parties. The state provides only a judge to decide the case and its
authority to enforce the judge's decision. Yet recently, the courts in the
United States have been the forum for a significant social transformation,
which has helped to make the substantive law as a whole less individualistic
and more communitarian. A primary element of this transformation is the
expansion of anti-discrimination principles in housing, education, employ-
ment, and public accommodations.
The apparent anomaly of an individualistic system of dispute resolution
producing communitarian social change is not so difficult to fathom when
one realizes that the adversary system itself has undergone significant
communitarian development. Many non-adversarial elements in modern
litigation reduce party control over the investigation and presentation of
evidence, and thrust the judge into the process early and often. These
developments make it possible to bring before the courts complex disputes,
the effects of which extend far beyond the nominal parties to the case.
They make both the dispute resolution system and its potential substantive
effects more communitarian, in part by enabling legal decisionmaking to
give greater effect to the rule-making and behavior modification goals. In
short, it is the non-adversarial elements in modem adjudication that make
it possible to bring such disputes before the courts. At the same time, the
adversarial debate format aids in the important evaluative process by
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requiring that the strongest arguments for and against proposed social
change be made. Whether this joinder of non-adversarial elements and the
adversarial debate format is a marriage made in heaven remains to be
seen, but it cannot be doubted that significant legal development has taken
place in the courts in recent years.
The principles developed here do not apply only to complex litigation,
though complex litigation is where they are most evident. Some non-
adversarial elements in modern litigation exist because adversarial inves-
tigation and presentation of evidence is not well suited to fact-finding.
The problems with adversarial fact-finding have come to the surface as
the factual basis of disputes has grown more complicated, but the problems
exist in litigation that is factually simpler as well. For fact-finding, a
neutral investigator aided by the parties-the inquisitorial system-may
well be better.
CONCLUSION
Adversarial ideology has failed. The adversary system is transforming
itself into a more inquisitorial, less individualistic methodology even as
apologists debate the various justifications for adversarial adjudication.
The transformation seems to be bringing about a system that is more
effective at fairly complex fact-finding, socially significant rule-making,
and behavior-modifying litigation. The less individualistic, more commu-
nitarian ethic that is reflected in the transformation should be recognized
and encouraged. That recognition may entail abandoning adversarial ide-
ology, but a focus on our goals and values is more helpful in evaluating
and modifying our adjudicatory system than any rigid ideology could be.
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